REFLECTIONS

ON THE

Domeſtic Policy,

Proper to be obſerved on the

CONCLUSION of a PEACE.

Non ea dixi in quibus, ſi non fuerint, non vinci me malim quam vincere. CICER. LUCUL.

LONDON:
Printed for A. MILLAR, in the Strand.
MDCCLXIII.
[Price 1 s. 6 d.

BRITISH MUSEUM

October, 1762.

Advertiſement.

THE following Reflections were printed laſt Autumn; but as the Negociations, with Mr. *Buſſy*, were then broke off, the Publication was deferred to a future Opportunity. The Negotiations for Peace being now renewed, and it being generally believed, from other Circumſtances, that the war will ſoon draw to a Concluſion, the preſent Occaſion is judged very proper for laying theſe Reflections before the Public.

ERRATUM.

Page 88. line 18. *after* inſtances, *inſert* can be given.

MVSEVM BRITANNICVM

REFLECTIONS

ON THE

DOMESTIC POLICY,

Proper to be obſerved on the CONCLUSION of a PEACE.

THE victories and ſucceſſes with which it has pleaſed God to bleſs our arms in the courſe of this war, having at length brought our enemies to ſue for peace, we have great reaſon to expect, from the prudence and vigour that have of late prevailed in our councils, that during the negociations, the intereſt of the nation will be zealouſly attended to, and ſuch a barrier placed againſt the reſtleſs ambition of our neighbouring kingdom, as will put it out of its power to diſturb our tranquillity for a conſiderable time to come. But when we have once ſecured ourſelves by an honourable peace from the ambition and inſults of our neighbours, it will be extremely proper to turn our eyes homeward, and ſtudiouſly to purſue ſuch a plan of domeſtic policy as may have the greateſt tendency to promote the proſperity of the nation. No other advantages whatever can make up for the neglect of this policy. Victories gained, and territories acquired are of no account without it; but a nation that adheres to it ſtea-

dily, will not only weather almoſt every calamity, but will increaſe in ſtrength and vigour even in the midſt of diſtreſſes.

Great Britain tho' happily victorious over her enemies, yet for many years paſt has been fatally deficient in ſeveral eſſential points relating to the internal policy of the ſtate, which if not now redreſſed will render our preſent proſperity extremely precarious, and in a great meaſure blaſt all the ſucceſſes of our arms. The pernicious effects of corrupt adminiſtration have long been generally felt and complained of, and many private efforts have been made to check their baneful influence; but the ignorance or wilful inactivity of thoſe in power, from time to time fruſtrated thoſe patriot attempts, which no way ſuited with their ſyſtem of government.

At length, however, the mean arts of corruption, which have precipitated the nation into a moſt diſtreſsful and dangerous ſituation, have been nobly diſcountenanced by the higheſt authority, and all honeſt men have been invited from the throne to co-operate with their ſovereign in advancing the proſperity of the nation. This royal invitation will no doubt animate the zeal of men of integrity, will revive an active ſpirit of patriotiſm among all ranks, and prompt thoſe who have their country's welfare at heart, to purſue with ardour and reſolution, the means moſt likely to reform the public abuſes, and reſtore health and vigour to the conſtitution. If the preſent golden opportunity be properly improved, we may ſo far, as the viciſſitude of human affairs will permit, give a ſtability to the grandeur of the Britiſh empire, and ſecure, not only to ourſelves, but to our poſterity, the moſt valuable bleſſing of public liberty; but if our political

grievances,

grievances, and the great depravity of manners which they have introduced, be ſuffered to remain unchecked and uncontrolled, it is to be feared that they will quickly be attended with ruin and deſolation.

Much will depend upon the deliberations of this preſent parliament; but the wiſhed for reformation may alſo, in ſome meaſure, be promoted even by perſons in private ſtations, as the domeſtic policy of a ſtate is a ſubject equally open to every one converſant in hiſtory, and who by his natutural inclination is led to turn his thoughts to matters of government. The author of the following reflections has endeavoured to delineate the outlines of ſuch a plan of policy as he hopes would tend to advance the proſperity of Britain; and he will think himſelf extremely happy if any thing here ſuggeſted can afford the leaſt hint to thoſe who make the welfare of this nation their care and ſtudy.

As it is the opinion of many judicious writers that the population of Britain has been declining for theſe ſeveral years paſt, and that we have not of late had a ſufficient number of men to carry on our various manufactures, and at the ſame time to fight our battles, the utmoſt attention ought to be given to remedy this capital deficiency. At the concluſion of a war, which is a time of diſſipation, many of our people being at a loſs how to diſpoſe of themſelves at home, are apt to rove abroad; therefore it ought to be our principal concern immediately upon the ratification of the treaties, to provide for the ſoldiers, ſailors, and carpenters diſcharged from the public ſervice. Their number will be very conſiderable, probably no fewer than 40,000 ſoldiers, 40,000 ſailors, and 4000 carpenters and labourers, in all

84,000 men. It is not an overſtrained ſuppoſition, to imagine that 16,000 women and children depend upon theſe, which will make the number of thoſe deprived of a livelihood at the peace to amount to 100,000.

At the end of laſt war a ſettlement was made in Nova Scotia, which ſerved as an aſylum to ſeveral thouſand of the diſcharged troops, and has been ſupported annually by grants from parliament ever ſince. As we have increaſed our territories in America during this war, and have large tracts of land on that continent uncultivated, it has lately been propoſed by ſome to make new ſettlements there for our diſcharged ſoldiers, where they could eaſily procure a ſubſiſtence, and would ſerve to protect the frontiers, and awe the Indians.

On the other hand I will venture to propoſe that they ſhould all be provided for, if poſſible, in the iſland of Britain; not that I mean, in the leaſt, to derogate from the importance of the ſettlement of Hallifax, which has fully anſwered the purpoſes it was intended for. But if we ſecure the excluſive navigation of the lakes, have a fortreſs about Oſwego or at Frontenac, and keep two armed frigates ſtationed in the Miſſiſſippi and the Ohio, our frontiers would be fully protected, and the Indians thoroughly awed; for if their natural acuteneſs be ſuch as it is repreſented, they could not but perceive our unrivaled ſuperiority, ſo that their own intereſt would lead them to court our friendſhip rather than contend with our power. In all probability we ſhall have no hoſtile diſputes in America for many years, but what may be decided by the ſtrength of the colonies; therefore there is no great neceſſity of providing for our ſecurity before-hand by leaving a military force in that continent. But no one can anſwer for the con-

continuance of the tranquillity in Europe, as the French, however beaten and exhauſted, recruit their vigour in a few years, the thirſt of the Germans for bloody ſquabbles ſeems incurable, and the claims in Italy may perhaps be referred to the arbitration of the ſword.

It would no doubt be thought madneſs to tranſport our grand magazine of arms from the Tower to America; but I had much rather that our arſenal ſhould be tranſported thither than our ſenſible men. As our colonies are now out of their infant ſtate, it is needleſs to be providing with great earneſtneſs for the farther peopling of them; for if the tranquillity of the inhabitants be ſecured, they will of themſelves multiply ſufficiently. A gentleman of Philadelphia, to whom the world is indebted for ſeveral ingenious philoſophic diſcoveries, has ſhewn that the coloniſts in general double their numbers by procreation alone every twenty-five years; ſo that in half a century the plantations will be four times as populous as they are at preſent; whereas if we do not give our attention to ſupply the drains from the mother country, in all probability, our numbers fifty years hence, will not be increaſed one eighth part of the preſent inhabitants. It is doubtleſs of more importance to the nation that the numbers of people ſhould increaſe in this and the neighbouring iſland than in America; for a ſhip might as well attempt to carry her lading hung to the end of her bolt-ſprit as a government to manage a people widely diſperſed, and more numerous towards the extremities than towards the center. I may therefore aſk any coloniſt who deſires the proſperity of the Britiſh empire, whether he would not rather wiſh to ſee three millions more of in-

habitants

habitants in Britain and Ireland than ſix in America.

But by what better means can Britain be peopled than by retaining her native ſubjects, eſpecially thoſe, who in return for the labours and fatigues they have undergone in the ſervice of the public, have a moſt juſt claim to its protection. If the propriety of ſettling the troops at home be allowed, we ought next to think of diſpoſing of them in ſuch a manner as would render their ſettlements of the greateſt advantage to the nation. As the ſea which encompaſſes us, is both our rampart and the channel of our wealth, the more we are habituated to it, the more we ſhall be in a capacity of defending ourſelves, and of annoying our enemies, and the greater opportunities we ſhall have of advancing the trade and increaſing the riches of the nation. By multiplying our ſettlements, therefore, on the ſea coaſts, and on the banks of navigable rivers, we at the ſame form nurſeries for future navies, and render it more eaſy for great numbers of men to procure a ſubſiſtence. Were the banks of all the navigable rivers in Great Britain lined with ſettlements, it may eaſily be conceived what an immenſe population this fruitful iſland could admit of. There are doubtleſs at preſent more inhabitants on the banks of the Thames, reckoning within two miles on each ſide of the river, than there were in the whole iſland when it was invaded by Julius Cæſar; yet from the ſource of the river to its mouth what an abundance of the neceſſaries and conveniencies of life prevails. The many large and populous cities ſituated on the banks of the Rhine and of the Maeſe in Flanders are ſo far from incommoding each other by their numbers of inhabitants, that when the latter were more populous than they are

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at preſent, they were alſo more flouriſhing. Theſe examples ſhew us that numbers of people are ſo far from diſtreſſing one another by their vicinity, that if they are induſtrious, they are mutual helps to each other.

How erroneous then is the common opinion, that it is impoſſible to earn a livelihood at home, and that we muſt either turn ourſelves to foreign commerce, or ſeek to get poſſeſſion of ſome new plantation, where we may have full ſcope to raiſe ſuch a revenue from the ground as will make us live in plenty. If land can be procured cheap in America, ſo can it alſo be in Britain, nay, I may ſay, in ſome places of this iſland cheaper than in thoſe parts of America where the ſettlements would be of the greateſt national importance. Dean Swift in computing the difficulties that new ſettlers have to encounter with in America from grubbing up of trees, from the high rate of the wages of artificers, and from other inconveniencies, reckons that their lands, tho' given them, in their original ſtate, as a preſent, may juſtly be ſaid to coſt them an hundred years purchaſe before they be brought to a ſtate of cultivation. Allowing that the Dean has exaggerated his computation, yet the expence of new ſettlements in thoſe countries, where nothing beſides the common fruits of the earth are raiſed, muſt doubtleſs be either very conſiderable, or the profits ariſing from the ſettlements muſt be trifling. By the confeſſion of a gentlemen who had a grant of lands at Hallifax the clearing of one acre coſt him between forty and fifty pounds, and when it was cleared it was hardly of any ſervice, the ſoil being of a light ſandy barren nature. He could not certainly have laid out his money to greater diſadvantage in attempting improvements in many unculti-

uncultivated parts of this iſland. The revenue raiſed from the ground in Britain at preſent, is not one half, nay one fourth of what it might be, and excluſive of the products of the earth which might be thus increaſed, the ſea which waſhes all our coaſts affords an eaſy ſubſiſtence to the inhabitants. A very little land, when well cultivated, will ſupply food for one man, therefore to give large tracts of uncultivated land in a remote country, as a ſubſiſtence to a poor man, is an uſeleſs, if not a moſt burdenſome preſent. It would be of more advantage to him to make him the proprietor of a ſmall houſe and garden in the midſt of his friends, where to the produce of his garden, he could add a certain revenue by his application to ſome handicraft or manufacture.

The labour and fatigue the troops have undergone during the war will now make repoſe the more grateful to them, and if they can have but a ſettled habitation which they can call their own, they will not probably be very ſollicitous to have a ſumptuous one. From the ſmall buildings erected near Chelſea hoſpital, we may ſee that the invalids prefer the happineſs of domeſtic liberty in a hut, to the being crowded in the magnificent apartments of a palace. As companionſhip is greatly cultivated among ſoldiers, it will be no ſmall ſatisfaction to them to live together in civil life; therefore it would be adviſeable, when they are diſcharged, to ſettle them in ſmall bodies in different parts of the kingdom not occupied by other inhabitants, conferring ſuch ſmall immunities upon them as ſhould encourage them to neſtle, by rendering their ſubſiſtence as little expenſive as poſſible. As their daily intercourſe with each other would keep alive their martial diſpoſition, they would be ready to be formed into an army

upon any other emergency; but ſuppoſing they ſhould never again appear in the field in the quality of ſoldiers, their children might, and the advantage of the eſtabliſhments propoſed, would, in other reſpects, be very conſiderable to the nation.

Tho' many enliſt from a ſpirit of idleneſs; yet great numbers enter into the ſervice from a ſpirit of enterprize, and are far from putting off their induſtry when they put on the red coat. Some of theſe, who perhaps may have improved themſelves by obſervations in their travels, will now be inclined to profit by the remarks they have made, and their diligence and activity will animate the ſlothful, who, if left to their own direction, would probably become either a burden or a nuiſance to ſociety.

Tho' it ſhould ſeem expenſive to form the propoſed eſtabliſhments effectually, yet that conſideration ought not to deter us, as the national benefit ariſing from them would be ſo conſiderable. But if it ſhould be found that the diſpoſing of the ſoldiers in this manner would even be leſs expenſive than the methods hitherto purſued in providing for them, that ought to be another motive for ſettling them at home.

The expences of the ſettlement of Nova Scotia for the ten years following the firſt eſtabliſhment of it, excluſive of the guards and garriſons in that country, amount to 582,270 £. and the charge of the out-penſioners in Chelſea, during the ſame number of years is 478,448 £. and both united make the ſum of 1,060,718 £. If the ſame plan for providing for the troops be obſerved at the following peace, it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe that the ſame expences would be incurred during the ten following years.

On the other hand let us take a view of the expences of the ſettlements propoſed. We ſhall ſuppoſe the 40,000 ſoldiers (for we ſhall ſpeak of the carpenters and ſailors by themſelves) to be ſettled in twenty eſtabliſhments of 2000 men each in different parts of Britain, upon lakes or navigable rivers, or places adjoining to the ſea, each man having an houſe and an acre of land aſſigned him, free for ten years, and to be upon the Chelſea outpenſion for the firſt year after the forming of the eſtabliſhment. There are many places in Britain where the land is ſtill lying uncultivated and deſolate, and doubtleſs ſome ſuch tracts could be found near the ſea, or on the banks of the Severn, the Trent, the Ouſe, the Tyne, the Forth, the Tay, the Clyde, or on the lakes of Scotland, and the rent of ſuch in their preſent condition cannot be above a ſhilling an acre, which makes the rent of the whole for ten years 20,000 £. Gentlemen who have wide eſtates, with ſome corners of them uncultivated, would even find it for their advantage to give the ground, for ſuch ſettlements, for ten years *gratis*; as at the end of that term they would have 2000 additional tenants, who would be in a capacity of paying rent both for their land and houſes. Landed gentlemen are very ſenſible of the advantage of having their grounds well ſtocked with cattle; but a little reflection would ſhew them that it would be much more profitable to ſtock them with men and women, who may always be induced to apply themſelves to induſtry, if mildly governed and prudently adviſed.

The next article of the expence of theſe ſettlements, is the houſes, which built in hut faſhion, as is generally the manner of new ſettlers, could not exceed the charge of ten pounds each, excluſive of the ſoldiers own labour in erecting them.

Thoſe

Thoſe only that are married, who may be reckoned about one fifth of the whole number, ought to have houſes to themſelves, and the others, who are batchelors, might very well be lodged four in one houſe, till ſuch time as they ſhould marry. The number of houſes would then be 16,000, and the expence of erecting them 160,000 £. The laſt article to be mentioned is the out-penſion for 40,000 men, making the ſum of 304,333 £. and this added to the two former articles amounts to 484,333 £. which is the whole charge of the ſettlements, and is not above two thirds of the expences of the colony of Nova Scotia.

No body, I am perſuaded, will conteſt the advantages that would ariſe to the nation from ſuch ſettlements. Two of the wiſeſt princes of Europe, the king of Pruſſia and the king of Denmark have given their attention to the increaſing the number of villages in their dominions. The King of Pruſſia, before the preſent war, eſtabliſhed no leſs than ſixty new villages in Pomerania, and the king of Denmark, whoſe conduct is directed upon patriot principles, not many months ago encouraged by his royal bounty ſeveral new ſettlers in Holſtein.

Some may, perhaps, alledge that the allowance of one acre to one man is not ſufficient, as three acres are generally computed to be requiſite for the ſubſiſtence of one perſon. But I would deſire thoſe to reflect that it is not intended either that the ſettlers ſhould draw all their ſubſiſtence from the ground, or that the government ſhould furniſh the whole of it to them. The cultivation of the land ought to be the employment of only a few of the ſettlers, and all of them having a ſhare in its produce, ought to expect the remaining part of their ſubſiſtence from their application to ſome

trade or handicraft. On this plan they would find that a houſe and one acre at home would be of greater advantage to them than fifty acres in America.

Tho' they could not at firſt apply to work with the aſſiduity of common workmen, yet the application of ſix hours a-day might be expected from them, and it would be very hard indeed, if ſo many hours induſtry ſhould not be worth ſixpence, ſo that their ſubſiſtence in time of peace would not probably fall ſhort of what it had been in time of war. To attach them to induſtry it would perhaps be proper that their houſes ſhould be built contiguous; that all thoſe of one trade ſhould live together; that the town ſhould be ſurrounded with a ſmall earthen rampart; that a vigorous civil diſcipline ſhould be eſtabliſhed by voluntary election; that it ſhould be penal to be ſeen lounging in a forenoon; that no public-houſe ſhould be opened before ſix in the evening; and that premiums ſhould be annually conferred on the moſt active and induſtrious.

There is a more preſſing neceſſity for eſtabliſhments of this kind in Scotland than in any other part of the iſland, and ſtill more particularly in the Highlands, where the people want examples and motives to reconcile them to induſtry. The travels of thoſe Highlanders who have been employed in the public ſervice, will have opened their minds, ſo that when they return home, they cannot but be fully ſenſible of the naked and uncultivated ſtate of their own country. None, therefore, could be more proper than they would be, to introduce new improvements into their country, as their countrymen would be much more apt to imitate them than any others. The nature of that part of the iſland would require that the ſettle-

ſettlements ſhould be ſmall and numerous, that all the ſubſiſtence each townſhip wanted might be raiſed within its own neighbourhood. Were there many ſuch ſmall townſhips to be formed in different parts in the Highlands, it would be a certain means of curing the indolence of the preſent inhabitants, who do not want for vigour of mind if models of induſtry were ſet before them. The ſoil in Swiſſerland is even more rugged and the winter more rigorous than in the worſt parts of this iſland; yet that country, we find, is extremely populous; and no doubt if attention were given to cultivate the Highlands they would be able to ſupport ſix times the number of the preſent inhabitants. Tho' there have been numerous levies raiſed in the Highlands during the preſent war; yet that is far from being a proof of their populouſneſs, as ſome have concluded: on the contrary it ſhews that they are at this time more exhauſted than they have been for many years. In England, where the people employ themſelves in trades and manufactures, ſcarce one in forty is tempted to enliſt; whereas among the Highlanders we have ſeen, within theſe few years, both ſtriplings and men in advanced age, quitting their habitations to ſerve in remote countries, and the father, ſon, and grandſon engaged in the ſame battle. Therefore when mention is made of the numbers raiſed on this occaſion, if we, at the ſame time, reflect on the manner how they have been raiſed, the notion of the populouſneſs of the country will immediatly vaniſh.

The ſtate of the Highlands, even to this day, in ſome manner reſembles that of Scandinavia in the time of the incurſion of the Goths into the Roman empire. As celibacy is very rare among the inhabitants, and they generally marry young, they are con-

conſequently prolific; but notwithſtanding their numerous iſſue, the number of their villages and cottages hardly ever increaſes, and their country from generation to generation has remained almoſt a deſart waſte. The young brood were always either ſwept off by inteſtine broils, or foreign wars, or were prompted by neceſſity to abandon their native hills and vales, where induſtry met with all kinds of diſcouragement from their leading men, who were blind to its advantages, or wilfully wanted to ſhut it out, that they might the more eaſily tyrannize over their wretched vaſſals. The words of Cæſar in his account of the German ſtates, might very juſtly be applied to their chiefs: *Illis maxima laus eſt, quam latiſſimas circum ſe vaſtatis finibus ſolitudines habere.* Tho' for theſe ſeveral years paſt, the landed gentlemen in that part of the country have been fully ſenſible of the bad effects of the former wretched policy; yet the common people for want of inſtructors ſtill continue ignorant of the advantages of trades and new ſettlements. For example, if a Highlander has three or four ſons, the eldeſt of courſe is ſucceſſor to his father in his cottage and his effects, but no thought is taken to provide for the others, by breeding one of them a weaver, another a carpenter, or another a ſmith. No, the young lads lounge about as herds to the cattle, till a recruiting ſerjeant comes, and by a few flattering words, and ſhewing them a bit of ſplendid metal, perſuades them to go and ſell their blood to foreigners for a groat a-day. The preſent occaſion is extremely favourable for introducing new maxims among them; and as there never were ſo many Highlanders employed at one time in the public ſervice as during this war, if thoſe of them who ſhall be diſcharged at the peace, were to be

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ſettled in the manner above propoſed, on the forfeited eſtates in their country, and by encouragements kept to induſtry, their numbers would greatly add to the influence of their example. Allowing even that they ſhould make but little progreſs in trades and manufactures, they would at leaſt ſerve as a nurſery for future levies of brave and hardy men, zealouſly attached to the government, and that conſideration alone ought to be an inducement to promote the eſtabliſhments propoſed, eſpecially in that country.

It is of ſtill greater importance to the nation that ſome expedient ſhould be thought of for procuring a ſubſiſtence for the diſcharged ſailors and carpenters, and for preventing them from going abroad into the ſervice of foreigners at the concluſion of the war. If we neglect to provide for them, our rivals will undoubtedly profit by our negligence. We reſtore to the French at the peace about 24,000 priſoners, moſt of them ſeafaring men, whoſe ardour for buſineſs will no doubt be wheted by their tedious confinement here, which has thrown them ſo many years back in the purſuit of their fortunes. We have taken from them almoſt all their ſhipping, conſequently when a free navigation is opened to them by the peace, new veſſels will be put upon the ſtocks in all their ports, and the greateſt encouragement given to ſhip carpenters, who may depend upon conſtant employment for a long time. If therefore the French ſhould wheedle over 10,000 of our ſailors and ſhip carpenters, who are ungratefully left to ſtarve in their own country, ought we to be ſurpriſed to ſee their ſhipping in a few years in as flouriſhing a condition as it was before the war, and their commerce as extenſive.

To ſave ourſelves from future regrets on this ſubject, we ought now to make it our ſtudy to find full employment for all our ſailors and carpenters at home, and this can be effected by nothing ſo well as eſtabliſhing and encouraging an extenſive herring fiſhery. This rich traffic, which Providence has laid at our feet, if well conducted might prove the chief ſupport of the grandeur of the nation. The ſmall progreſs we have hitherto made in eſtabliſhing it cannot be attributed to the want of natural advantages, or to our unaptneſs for the ſea; but muſt be owing either to the expenſive or improper means of carrying it on, or to our ſlighting it from an opinion that it is not a channel of trade worthy of our attention. It cannot, however, be thought to be trifling or of ſmall national importance by thoſe who reflect that it annually affords a maintenance to 500,000 perſons in Holland, and that the Dutch, by the computation of Sir Walter Raleigh and others, raiſe by it ſeveral millions Sterling annually. The great utility of the fiſhery having been ſo often and ſo fully demonſtrated, let us, notwithſtanding the difficulties we have hitherto ſtruggled with, ſtill perſevere in our deſign of eſtabliſhing it, and even proſecute it at this time with new vigour. Let us give our chief attention to improve our natural advantages, which will greatly leſſen the expence, and we need not fear ſoon to turn the ballance ſo much in our favour, as to be able to continue the trade both to private and national benefit.

If the Dutch could catch the herrings on their own coaſts, would not they think themſelves happy to ſave a voyage of 200 leagues. No one certainly that has a mine in Cornwal would chuſe to lodge his miners in Devonſhire or Wales. As the weſtern

weſtern iſlands are allowed to be the very center of the fiſhery, ſtiled by the Dutch *a golden mine*, would not reaſon require that they ſhould alſo be the chief reſidence of the fiſhermen, eſpecially as in thoſe parts, the fiſhery is not a temporary employment of a few weeks, but might be carried on, in different branches, almoſt the whole year round.

The ſituation, ſoil, and climate of thoſe iſlands, when but conſidered with the leaſt attention, all invite us to make ſettlements upon them, if we wiſh to proſecute the fiſhery in a ſucceſsful manner. Their ſituation is admirable, not only as the fiſh ſurround all their coaſts, and fill their bays and creeks, which renders large buſſes unneceſſary, and enables the fiſhermen to ſleep on ſhore ſeveral nights of the week; but alſo as the navigation from them is ſo convenient either to the northern kingdoms, the Mediterranean, or the Weſt Indies. Their climate is much more mild than that of the oppoſite continent, and their winters are very rarely rigorous. The ſoil, tho' but badly cultivated by the preſent inhabitants, is, however, ſo fertile that it yields in ſeveral places thirty, ſixty, and even ſometimes an hundredfold. Almoſt all the iſlands contain a great abundance of marle, ſo that were they to be cultivated to their greateſt extent, they would admit of being extremely populous without any other ſupport beſides agriculture.

But if there was not an inch of mould upon them, ſuch is their happy ſituation for trade, and ſuch the riches of the fiſhery upon their coaſts, that if theſe advantages were improved by the induſtry of men, a flouriſhing city might ſupport itſelf upon each of the larger iſlands. Attica, tho' anciently very populous, was always noted

for its barrenneſs. The large and magnificent city of Genoa, ſtands on a mountainous, rocky and barren coaſt, which according to the teſtimony of the elegant hiſtorian Folieta, is ſo far from ſupplying proviſions to its capital, that it draws its chief ſupport from that trading city; *Notum enim non Genuam a Liguria, ſed ſterilem Liguriam a Genua ali.* The Belgic iſlands, or the iſlands of Zeland, in the time of Cæſar, were only inhoſpitable moraſſes, with ſcarce any other inhabitants than wild ſea-fowls; but at this day we ſee them well cultivated and crowded with beautiful and populous towns. As the weſtern iſlands lie ſo conveniently for the navigation to America, and our intercourſe with that continent is daily increaſing; as they enjoy as favourable a climate as thoſe of Zeland, belong to as induſtrious and enterpriſing a people, and are ſurrounded with an inexhauſtable fund of wealth, the following century may perhaps ſee many flouriſhing towns upon them, and multitudes of ſhips frequenting their ports. This will not appear a ſurprizing ſuppoſition to a perſon who conſiders the flux of human things.

The chief objection hitherto made againſt purſuing the fiſhery is, that the whole profit, and more than the profit, is conſumed by the great expences attending the trade, and indeed according to the meaſures that have yet been obſerved, it could hardly have been expected to have been otherwiſe. The buſſes are built large as if intended for foreign voyages; they are only employed a few months of the year; they are fitted out at a great expence; the ſailors and fiſhermen are not intereſted in the ſucceſs of the fiſhery, by being made partners in it; and a trifling home conſumption at extravagant prices, has been more ſtudied than a foreign trade at ſmall profits.

Let

Let the means purſued for the future be but the reverſe of theſe, and we need not deſpair of ſucceſs. Inſtead of laying up the buſſes half the the year in places remote from the center of the trade, and where the charge of repairs is rendered expenſive by the high prices both of materials and of mens labour; let magazines and ſtorehouſes be formed in the weſtern iſlands, which lie equally convenient for receiving naval ſtores from the Baltic or America. The company thus having dock-yards of their own, and workmen at low wages, the charge of fitting out and of repairs would be conſiderably diminiſhed; and the fiſhermen, being conſtantly employed almoſt at their own doors, in ſmall veſſels for nine or ten months of the year, the profits of the trade would be greatly increaſed.

The diſcharged carpenters and ſailors ought to be tempted by conſiderable advantages and immunities, to make thoſe iſlands the place of their habitation. Thoſe of them who are married ought each of them to have ſome ſmall allowance for building an houſe; for their private ſtocks cannot be ſuppoſed to be large, and to have a home that a perſon can call his own is no ſmall inducement to ſobriety and induſtry. If they ſhould even be freed from the payment of all taxes and duties for ſeven years, and their ports be left open, on condition of forfeiting this laſt privilege, if they imported more than what ſerved for their own conſumption, the public revenue would ſcarce feel any diminution. As they could not be ſuppoſed to have much money, they could purchaſe nothing from foreigners but by the ſale of their own ſtaple commodity, and to indulge them with the free bartering of it to ſupply their own con-

ſumption would be a powerful inducement to their ſettling in thoſe iſlands.

This would alſo be a great temptation to foreigners to ſettle there, if at the ſame time they were allowed the full enjoyment of all the privileges of native ſubjects. Foreign fiſhermen, even without ſuch encouragement, have ſeemed inclined to take up their reſidence in the iſlands ſubject to Britain; were the government therefore to invite them by the offer of immunities and privileges, it is but reaſonable to expect that great numbers from Hamburg, Norway and Holland, would embrace the opportunity of living under our laws. Mr. Martin in his account of the weſtern iſles, tells us, "That after the reſtoration, a few Dutch "families ſettled in Stornway in the iſle of Lewis; "but ſome cunning merchants found means by "the ſecretaries to prevail with king Charles to "ſend them away, tho' they not only brought "money into the iſland, but taught the inhabi-"tants ſomething of the art of fiſhng. The "ſmall idea of fiſhing they had from the Dutch "has had ſuch an effect as to make the people of "the little village of Stornway to excel all thoſe "of the neighbouring iſles and continent, ever "ſince that time." In another place he ſays, "That the inhabitants of the town of Lerwick in "Zetland, in the ſpace of thirty years, increaſed "from three or four families to three hundred, "chiefly by the arrival of foreigners." By the former of theſe inſtances it appears, that if foreigners could be tempted to ſettle on thoſe iſlands, they would not only contribute to the national wealth and ſtrength by their own induſtry, but would alſo inſtruct the natives how to earn a ſubſiſtence, many of whom, we are told by the ſame author, tranſmigrate annually into other countries

for

for want of knowing how to employ themſelves at home.

If the ſailors and fiſhermen were to ſhare in the ſucceſs of the fiſhery, 'tis natural to conclude that they would be more attentive to improve all opportunities and advantages; and in caſe of an unſucceſsful ſeaſon, or any other croſs accidents, the loſs would not fall ſo heavy on thoſe who employed their money in promoting the trade. In Holland, and ſeveral places in North Britain, the the cuſtom is that the ſeamen go out adventurers, and they themſelves, it is ſaid, look upon this as the moſt reaſonable and encouraging way. No good argument, I think, can be aſſigned for not making this the general practice thro' the whole trade. Let no other workmen therefore be employed, in any branch of the fiſhery, excluſive of the twine ſpinners, net-makers, and others in the moſt ſervile offices, unleſs they agree to go ſharers in the profit and loſs of the trade; that is, let the ſhip-carpenters, rope-makers, ſail-makers, coopers, ſailors, and fiſhermen be jointly concerned with the merchant in fitting a buſs for the ſea, by which method, if they can but merely ſave themſelves from being loſers by the fiſhing, they are ſeverally gainers, having procured employment, each in his reſpective occupation.

As the forming of docks, erecting magazines, dreſſing of hemp, ſpinning of twine, making of nets, would be great articles of expence, the following propoſal for removing in a great meaſure that heavy charge may perhaps deſerve the conſideration of the public. Let all the convicts, who, according to the preſent method, are annually tranſported from Britain to America, be for the future ſent to ſome of the ſmall weſtern iſlands cloſe adjoining to the greater ones

and

and employed as ſlaves in hard labour on the different branches above ſpecified. When our colonies were in their infancy, and America was regarded as a Siberia, it is no wonder that tranſportation thither ſhould be looked upon as a puniſhment; but in the preſent populouſneſs and civilized ſtate of our colonies, it cannot be accounted the leaſt hardſhip to convicts to be carried from a life of miſery and indigence here, and landed in a fruitful country and favourable climate among civilized people who ſpeak their own language. Beſides, *Cælum non animum mutant:* as the voyage to America ſeldom alters the diſpoſitions of the convicts, they are looked upon as a nuiſance there, and ſome of them who have turned packmen, have been accuſed of practiſing their roguery upon the unwary Indians, and thereby alienating them from this nation, and even giving riſe to hoſtilities and wars betwixt them and us. On the other hand were they to be tranſported to the ſmall weſtern iſlands, as to ſo many priſons, and there kept at hard labour with an allowance of coarſe fare and mean lodging and cloathing, the dread of ſuch a puniſhment would doubtleſs be a greater reſtraint upon many villains than Tyburn itſelf. Beſides, when convicts are confined to a ſmall ſecluded ſpot, they cannot there corrupt others by their bad example; they are there ſecure from their former temptations; their baniſhment thither is a real puniſhment; and if care is taken to force them to work and be induſtrious, there they have the beſt chance of reforming and growing good.

The people at home, who, are fond of faſhionable novelties, giving extravagant prices for Britiſh herrings, foreign markets were thereupon ſlighted, as the ſmall profits they yielded bore no proportion to the expenſive manner of carrying on the

the trade. The great home conſumption, however, was but of very ſhort continuance, the dearneſs of the commodity having ſoon abated the ardour of the people for purchaſing it; and the demand ceaſing at home, the courſe of the trade which had ſcarce any other channel, was immediatly ſtopt. There is plainly not the leaſt need of any public encouragement for ſupplying the markets at home, where the commodity is ſo plentiful, and in ſuch a ſuperabundance that the people, for want of knowing how to diſpoſe of the fiſh they caught, have often been obliged to uſe them as manure for their lands. When fiſh are in ſuch plenty on any, even the remoteſt, coaſts of Britain, nothing but extortion or miſmanagement can make them dear in any of our great cities that have a free communication with the ſea. The bounty therefore ought to be limited ſolely to thoſe fiſh that are carried to a foreign market; and conſidering this gratuity, and the great ſuperiority of our natural advantages, were we to ſtudy carefully the leaſt expenſive methods of conducting the trade, by carrying it on thro' all the ſeaſons, and by building and fitting out the buſſes where workmanſhip and naval ſtores were at low prices, there is the greateſt reaſon to expect that we might ſoon be able to underſell the Dutch at foreign ports.

The herrings as they fall from the net are reckoned to coſt the Dutch ſix ſhillings a barrel, and it is computed that we might have them for two. Mr. Martin even ſays that they have been bought in the weſtern iſlands for a groat a barrel. The Dutch have no ſalt of their own, but are obliged to buy part of what they uſe from us. Naval ſtores can be carried from the Baltic to the weſtern iſlands, as cheap as from thence to Holland.

The

The ports of Britain are open all the year round; but ſeveral of thoſe of Holland are often frozen up for months together. We lie more convenient than the Dutch for the navigation to America, and to the ſouthern and northern parts of Europe; and if they can fare hard and be very laborious, they are in thoſe points exceeded by the bold fiſhermen of the weſtern and northern iſlands, who ſatisfy themſelves with a very ſcanty ſubſiſtence, and make no ſcruple of braving the wintery ſeas in ſmall open boats.

To ſucceed in eſtabliſhing the fiſhery, I believe, it would be found prudent not to aim at carrying it on all at once in the moſt extenſive manner; for it may be doubted whether ſuch attempts have not been among the chief cauſes of the ſmall progreſs we have hitherto made in this valuable trade. Suppoſe a company of the richeſt merchants in the nation, had attempted in the infancy of our hardware manufacture, to enlarge it at once to its preſent extent, by undertaking to build ſuch a city as Birmingham in four or five ſummers, and to people it with manufacturers in that branch, they would have found the enterprize too hard for them; and the profits no way compenſating the expence, the deſign would have abſolutely ruined the undertakers. In like manner were the fiſhery to be proſecuted in all the large ſea-port towns, the detached equipments, would from the general unacquaintedneſs with the new branch of buſineſs, become very expenſive, and the profits, for the ſame reaſon, be but inconſiderable, which would quickly bring the trade under diſrepute, and make the adventurers lay aſide all thoughts of proſecuting it. If we ſhould light a great number of ſmall tapers in different places, they would be liable to be blown out with every blaſt; but

were we to examine where there is the greateſt abundance of fewel, and to light up a ſmall fire in that ſpot, it would ſoon gather ſtrength, and gradually widen its circle till it became a large blaze. Let us, therefore, give our chief attention to promote the fiſhery in thoſe places where the natural advantages for carrying it on are moſt apparent, and no matter how ſmall, or how weak its firſt beginnings are, if we perſevere in cheriſhing a vital principle, it will increaſe annually, and in a ſhort time diffuſe itſelf widely thro' the whole nation. The reſtricting the chief bounties and privileges to thoſe who ſhould fiſh in the weſtern iſlands, could not in the leaſt make the undertaking the leſs national. How many who have plantations in the Weſt Indies manage their concerns in thoſe remote iſlands, without ſtirring out of Britain? It could not then be thought difficult for the merchants of London, or of other cities in Britain, to tranſact buſineſs in the weſtern iſlands, which are ſo ſituated that the correſpondence of letters could not meet with the leaſt interruption.

Tho' many of the diſcharged carpenters and ſailors ſhould not agree to engage in the fiſhery, and ſettle in the Weſtern iſlands, they ought nevertheleſs to be provided for by ſome other eſtabliſhments in Britain, as it is now more neceſſary for us than ever to encourage ſeamen, and to be formidable at ſea. The French, in conſequence of our conqueſts during this war, have now leſs to defend, and are therefore more at liberty to act offenſively. We, on the other hand, for the ſame reaſon, can leſs exert ourſelves in an offenſive manner for having ſo much to defend. Our numerous ſettlements on the continent and iſlands of America, have an extenſive frontier, which is expoſed for ſeveral thouſand miles to an enemy,

and can only be defended by maintaining a ſuperiority at ſea. If the exertive power of a ſtate, I mean that power always ready to be put in action, does not keep pace with the enlargement of its boundaries, the new acquiſitions made only tend to weaken the nation, by affording an enemy greater opportunities of invading it. The Spaniards, in the time of Philip II. boaſted that the ſun never ſet on their territories; but their naval force bearing no proportion to the wide extent of their dominions, their overgrown power was ſoon pulled down by a ſmall ſtate, whom but a few years before they had looked upon with the greateſt contempt. Having neglected to ſupport their marine, they loſt their ſuperiority at ſea, and were thereby cut off from affording protection to their foreign ſettlements, which were reduced in all parts of the world by the Dutch, who wiſely proſecuted trade with the utmoſt aſſiduity, and gave a watchful attention to naval armaments.

Our inſular ſituation happily freeing us from the charge of land frontiers, we can the more eaſily afford a powerful protection to our ſea frontier, which has this peculiar advantage, that a European enemy, before he can attack it, muſt remove far from his own country, and conſequently invade at great diſadvantage. But as fleets alone can protect our foreign ſettlements, we ought to avoid making too great a reduction in our marine article, or at leaſt we ought to make ſuch a proviſion for the ſailors who ſhall be diſcharged, that upon any ſudden emergency, we may always have a ſufficient number of them ready to man a powerful ſquadron for immediate ſervice. It may be laid down as a certain maxim that a navy neglected is a navy deſtroyed. Have we not found by ſad experience that the reducing of our marine in time

of peace to 10,000 men, was almoſt the ſame thing as if it had been totally annihilated? Let our paſt miſtakes therefore ſerve to inſtruct us in our future conduct.

Were we to be in a condition at all times of proſecuting hoſtilities at ſea, and it is there only, that in the beginning of a war, we can have occaſion to proſecute them, our enemies would be very careful how they committed any thing that looked like an infraction of the peace. Hitherto, preſuming upon our over ſecurity, and our being always unprovided in time of peace, they have been tempted to make light of treaties, and ſecured by fraud ſuch advantages as gave them the actual ſuperiority for the two or three firſt campaigns of a war, while we were only in a capacity of making weak efforts and fruitleſs exertions.

If we had a formidable naval ſtrength ready to be exerted upon the leaſt rupture, a war, which on account of the falſe ſteps made by us, and the loſſes we ſuffer in the firſt campaigns, has uſually been continued for ſeven or eight years, would probably be terminated in half that time, and much blood and treaſure be ſaved to the nation. A judicious and elegant author has moſt fully and clearly illuſtrated the propriety of maintaining 30,000 ſeamen in time of peace. His arguments and illuſtrations are couched in ſuch nervous expreſſions, and have all ſuch a mutual relation and connection, that to abridge them would be doing an unjuſtice both to the author and my readers, who will have great ſatisfaction in peruſing that maſterly performance *. Let us make an eſtimate of the expences of tenders and preſs-gangs, who ought to be otherwiſe employ-

* See three dialogues on the navy by Mr. Moncrief.

ed, of bounties for ſeamen, of the increaſed wages of ſailors on board the merchant ſhips, and of the extravagant inſurance paid for merchandize and ſhipping, the charge of all theſe during a war, would amount to a much higher ſum than what would be required for maintaining a ſtanding body of ſeamen during many years of peace. If, beſides the expence of theſe articles, we conſider the inconvenience of not being able to proſecute a war for the firſt two or three years to any advantage, how improvident will our paſt conduct appear.

Some French writers, who have lately treated of commerce, have propoſed that all the coaſts of France ſhould be turned into ſea-ports; and it would ſeem that their government had begun to act upon this principle by the expence beſtowed upon the harbour of Cherburg, lately deſtroyed by our troops, which owed its being a port almoſt wholly to art. As our numbers of ſeafaring people greatly exceed thoſe of the French, as our proſperity is intimately connected with the ſea, and our coaſts are more extenſive than thoſe of any other nation in Europe, we ought to adopt the maxim of the French writers abovementioned, and multiply our ſea-ports upon all our coaſts. Thoſe ſailors, therefore, who ſhould ſcruple to engage in the fiſhery, might be ſettled part of them on the coaſts of the Channel, and part at Milford haven, and might be engaged by a ſmall bounty to be ready to man a ſquadron, upon any occaſion, if the government ſhould at length be convinced of the expediency of maintaining a conſiderable naval force in time of peace. The crews of the royal yachts, tho' ſeldom employed, are kept always ready for duty by the allowance of their monthly wages, which is only about a third

part

part of their expence when in actual ſervice. By extending this bounty to ſeveral thouſand ſailors, we might have it always in our power to ſend a ſquadron to ſea with the greateſt diſpatch, and thereby to ſtifle thoſe ſparks of contention which might otherwiſe ſet all Europe in flames.

Now alſo is the time for making the neceſſary works at Milford haven, to fit that place for a royal dock-yard; and likewiſe for undertaking the large repairs and alterations that may be judged expedient in the other docks. To proſecute ſuch expenſive works during a war, when they might ſafely be deferred till a time of peace, is the height of imprudence and miſmanagement. By ſuch a conduct the expence of the nation is not only enhanced, at a time when all unneceſſary charges ought to be retrenched, but numbers of workmen are alſo left without employment during peace, when it is ſtill neceſſary that they ſhould practiſe thoſe trades upon which the ſtrength of the nation does not a little depend.

But upon the eſtabliſhment of a dock-yard at Milford haven, care ought to be taken to form it upon a leſs waſteful plan than that of the other yards. Such new regulations might eaſily be made, as would at the ſame time promote both the ſervice of the government and the advantage of the workmen, which are no ways incompatible with each other. More particularly a reform ought abſolutely to be made in two material articles, I mean the tap-houſe and the chips, which are only encouragements to idleneſs and fraud, and are openly condemned by the ſober part of the workmen *. Great numbers of ſhip-carpenters might

* The porter is allowed the privilege of keeping an open beer-houſe in the middle of the yard, which ſerves as a lounging

might be employed in time of peace, in forming the frames of ſhips to be ſtored up in magazines, as is the manner in Holland, by which means the government would not have ſuch a preſſing occaſion for hiring ſupernumerary workmen in time of war; and would ſave conſiderably by being under no neceſſity of building ſhips in private yards, which are found not to be ſo ſerviceable as thoſe built in the king's docks.

Tho' the ſettlements above propoſed may, perhaps, at firſt view appear to be rather too chargeable to the government; yet rating them even at the higheſt eſtimate they will be found not to equal the expence of other eſtabliſhments, which the nation has made no ſcruple of ſupporting very liberally. The two articles of expence, which I have already named, exceed the charge of the ſettlements I propoſe. Let us, for inſtance, ſum up the grants for Nova Scotia, and the out-penſioners of Chelſea hoſpital for ten years, the amount of the whole will be found greatly to exceed the charge of the propoſed ſettlements. Nova Scotia being now a regular civil government, and under no apprehenſions from a French enemy, can no longer require ſubſidies from the public. Suppoſing this article ſunk, the ſecond would in a great meaſure be abſorbed in the new eſtabliſhments, as it is propoſed to limit the out-penſion almoſt wholly to thoſe who reſided in the new ſettlements. Some few who

ing place for ſots and idle workmen. The worſt workmen are noted for haunting it, and on the other hand, it is the diſtinguiſhing character of the beſt artiſts, that they almoſt never enter it.

The chips that fall from the ax are the perquiſite of the carpenters, but this pretended privilege is ſhamefully abuſed by many workmen, who make up their bundle of chips by cutting uſeful wood to pieces, by which it may be eaſily demonſtrated that, in time of war, the government loſes more than 100,900 pounds annually.

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were abſolute invalids might perhaps ſhew juſt reaſons for being excepted; but let us even make a deduction of one half of the out-penſion for their ſupport, yet the other half, if added to the article abovementioned, would make a ſum larger than that which would be required for maintaining the new eſtabliſhments.

It ought alſo to be conſidered that the ſums expended for the ſettlements of the ſoldiers, and for the ſupport of the fiſhery, would not reſemble the other expences of government, but like the money laid out by traders and manufacturers, would quickly more then repay itſelf by the large profits made. Let us ſuppoſe that only 60,000 men, whoſe hands are at preſent filled with the weapons of war, were turned to induſtry, and by encouragements and judicious regulations, kept at conſtant employment, the annual returns of profit ariſing from their ſeveral occupations would greatly exceed the ſums granted by the public for their firſt eſtabliſhment. Their induſtry alſo may be ſuppoſed perpetual; but the public charge on their account would be but of very ſhort continuance. Beſides, our government differs widely from that of arbitrary ſtates. It not only like them extends its care to the defence of its ſubjects; but in a paternal manner exerts itſelf to promote the welfare of the meaneſt individuals. Our rulers, more particularly of late years, have diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their patriot zeal for promoting the intereſts of trade, and by the attention they have given to matters that concern the internal policy of the kingdom. In abſolute governments, on the other hand, ſchemes of ambition are looked upon as the objects of greateſt conſideration, the ſplendor of the monarch, and the welfare of the people are frequently thought inconſiſtent with each other, and the

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latter, on many occaſions made to give way to the former *. As our legiſlative body are now happily freed from factious conteſts, and the advancing the proſperity of the nation, has of late ſeemed their unanimous ſtudy, I may, therefore, preſume that the eſtabliſhments I have propoſed, both with regard to the fiſhery, the ſupport of our marine, and the ſettlements for the diſcharged troops, if they ſhould appear objects worthy of their conſideration, would be zealouſly proſecuted by them, tho' the expence ſhould be much higher than I have eſtimated it.

Great numbers of men, ſaved from wretchedneſs, and employed in virtuous induſtry, could not fail of adding conſiderably to the riches and power of the nation: but notwithſtanding ſuch a valuable acquiſition, if our rulers do not now apply themſelves to root out the baſe corruption that

* Of this we have a ſhocking inſtance in the barbarous policy of Lewis XIV. The forces of France, in the year 1709, were greatly exhauſted, in conſequence of the bad ſucceſs of their arms, and the people were reduced to great miſery by a famine, which then raged in ſeveral other kingdoms of Europe. The French generals, at the end of the campaign, gave in a liſt of the recruits that would be neceſſary for compleating the armies for the enſuing ſpring. To their great ſurprize, however, the king iſſued no orders for raiſing thoſe recruits, but commanded that care ſhould be taken to fill his magazines with corn from Barbary and other places. A few months after he cauſed it to be given out every where that his troops had plenty of corn, and, in the mean while, having purpoſely neglected to alleviate the miſeries of his ſubjects, the poor people, to ſave themſelves from ſtarving, entered into the ſervice in great numbers; ſo that he had quickly many thouſand recruits more than were neceſſary for compleating his armies. In all probability, for every recruit he got by this means, two or three of his ſubjects miſerably periſhed; his baſe flatterers, nevertheleſs, greatly applauded his refined policy, than which the annals of mankind can ſcarce furniſh an inſtance of greater inhumanity.

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has ſo long prevailed in our monied ſyſtem, all endeavours to ſecure the national proſperity will be blaſted, and prove ineffectual. An enormous load of public debts is in the body politic, like an abſceſs, or impoſthume, lurking in the vital parts of the human body; it drains the nouriſhment from the active members, induces a conſumptive habit, and, at length, by a ſlow waſting of the ſtrength, or, by a ſudden burſting, generally puts a period to the life of the patient. None will deny, but, that we have felt decays, in conſequence of the heavy incumbrance of our national debts, though from ſome favourable circumſtances we have hitherto happily bore up under them; but I will give an inſtance where they have actually proved fatal to a moſt flouriſhing ſtate, which at preſent is but a mere ſhadow of its antient ſplendor and power.

The republic of Genoa formerly carried on the greateſt trade in Europe, had flouriſhing colonies in Tartary, maintained a moſt powerful naval force, and was the center of the greateſt wealth in the weſtern parts of the world. Thoſe who peruſe the hiſtory of that ſtate may plainly perceive, that its declenſion is not owing, as is generally imagined, to the diſcovery of a new paſſage to the Eaſt Indies, which altered the channel of commerce; but to another cauſe, namely, to its imprudently mortgaging all its revenues to wealthy individuals, who, having politically got themſelves formed into one company, immediately became maſters of the republic *. The ſtate

* Eo anno magiſtratus S. Georgii inſtitutus eſt, atque altera prope reſpublica Genuam inducta, cujus rei, cauſa et origo hæc fuit. Cum aſſidua impendia in bella ac claſſes, quæ armabantur,

thenceforth felt itſelf deprived of all vigour, and had no longer reſources for carrying the ſmalleſt enterprize into execution, though, at the ſame time, the capital overflowed with wealth. The directors of the monied corporation, which took the name of *The Bank of St. George*, boldly becoming their own paymaſters, by aſſuming the adminiſtration of the revenues of the State, influenced and ſwayed all public deliberations, and making the public intereſt give way to the intereſt of their funds, ſeized all opportunities of taking advantage of the diſtreſſes of the government, whereby trade quickly began to languiſh, and the country to be diſpeopled. In a very ſhort time commerce entirely vaniſhed, and the republic, being thus deprived of its vital principle, was eaſily ſtripped of its foreign ſettlements, and ſunk in a few years into a torpid, and inactive ſtate, in which it has ever ſince continued, verifying the maxim of the hiſtorian Folieta, *mari adempto, omnia ſimul a Genuenſibus adimi.* Had it not been for its domeſtic incumbrances, its commerce might ſtill have flouriſhed

mabantur, atque alia quæ tempora reipublicæ neceſſario poſtulabant, facienda eſſent, pecuniæ a privatis hominibus, deficientibus publicis, crebro mutua ſumendæ erant, quibus, vectigalibus ipſis illis oppigneratis, cavebatur, fenuſque ex ipſiſmet vectigalibus mutuatarum pecuniarum creditoribus perſolvebatur, quod varium erat, caputque ipſum in portiones dividebatur, quas centenarum librarum eſſe placuit; ut qui mille libras mutuas dediſſet, decem portiones in vectigalibus haberet, pro quibus ſingulis certum fenus anniverſarium perciperet. Huic autem vectigali oppigneratо certus numerus civium publice præficiebatur; qui ratione crediti ac fructus vectigalium ſubducta, debitum fenus quotannis creditoribus cum fide perſolveret. Ceterum cum res, alio ſuper aliud vectigali deinceps oppigneratо, ita egeſtate publica cogente, in immenſum creviſſet, ſinguliſque vectigalibus oppigneratis certum numerum civium præfici neceſſe eſſet, tantaque multitudo confuſionem

riſhed, notwithſtanding the diſcovery of the paſſage by the Cape of Good Hope; for it is plain, the Genoeſe ly equally convenient for ſailing round Africa, as the Engliſh or Dutch. The Engliſh, by conſidering the progreſs and ſtate of the Genoeſe funds, may plainly ſee their own in miniature; and, as they will find to a demonſtration, that the bank of St. George has been the chief cauſe of the declenſion of that republic, it becomes them to reflect on the dangerous conſequences attending the unknown credit of the bank of England, and the other monied companies.

The parallel between the ſtate of the finances of that republic and of this nation, is, in many

 inſtances

fuſionem pareret, diſtracta hæc membra in unum corpus contracta, ac compacta ſunt, cui octoviralis magiſtratus præfectus eſt, qui veteribus nominibus, quibus vectigalia inter ſe diſtinguebantur omiſſis, S. Georgii appellatus eſt; juſque hoc illi additum, ut non jam publice ut antea eligeretur, ſed a creditoribus tantummodo ac vectigalium oppigneratorum participibus quotannis crearetur, qui nulla in re rectoribus civitatis, ac prætorio ſubeſſet neque ab illis penderet, ſed ſuas ſeparatas ædes, ſuaque ſegregata conſilia a republica haberet, conſilioque univerſæ civitatis haudquaquam conſulto, ſed altero conſilio, quod e participibus tantum conſtaret, convocato, de rebus ſuis pro arbitrio ſtatueret, quodque ſtatuiſſet jus eſſet, atque omnes participes teneret. Rectoreſque civitatis ante initum magiſtratum ad jusjurandum adigerentur (id quod perpetuo ſervatum eſt) ſeſe res S. Georgii non attacturos, neque quidquam de ejus juribus imminuturos. Hoc participum corpus alia ex alia neceſſitate bona publica oppignerandi indies exoriente, in immenſum numerum crevit; ejuſque dignitas et potentia majus robur indies aſſumpſit, inſulæ Corſicæ, ac nonnullorum aliorum reipublicæ locorum imperio illi adjuncto; ut ſic iiſdem mœnium ſæptis (res a nullis legiſlatoribus unquam excogitata ac nullis philoſophorum diſputationibus agitata) duæ reſpublicæ includantur; altera turbulenta ac diſcordiis civilibus, et ſeditionibus jactata et lacerata; altera quieta et pacata, incorruptos priſcos mores retinens, rectique domi ac foris exempli. Vide Foliet. Hiſt. Gen. ad an. 1407. See the conſequences of this moſt impolitic eſtabliſhment, in the years 1453, 1487, and 1492.

inſtances but too conſpicuous. The wealthy citizens of Genoa got themſelves formed into one company, and obtained permiſſion from their government to conſolidate the debts of the republic, and to have the direction of the levying the taxes which were almoſt all conſumed in paying the intereſt of their capital. In the year 1719, our rulers were ſo blind as to ſuffer a ſmall body of men, under the name of the South Sea Company, to become the creditors of the public for no leſs a ſum than 30 millions Sterling. If, to this ſum, we add the public debts, bought up by another ſmall body of men, named the Company of the Bank of England, we ſhall find a few wealthy individuals proprietors, not indeed of the whole national debt, but of more than two thirds of it, as it ſtood at that time. Theſe men, inſtead of applying the wealth they were in poſſeſſion of, to the generous purpoſes of advancing agriculture, commerce or manufactures, formed the baſe ſcheme of levying contributions on their fellow ſubjects, who were ſo unwary as to ſuffer them to put it in execution.

Our monied companies, 'tis true, have not, like that of Genoa, obtained the management of the public revenue; but have not the monied intereſt, and the landed intereſt long, with juſt reaſon, been looked upon as rival intereſts? Has not the influence of the monied intereſt been ſo great in parliament for many years paſt, as often to carry ſeveral points to the prejudice of the landed intereſt; and has it not even been acknowledged, that the miniſtry, for a long time paſt, have depended upon the monied men? Has not the dearneſs of commodities and the difficulty of living been greatly enhanced by the artificial increaſe of money, which is attended with all the bad conſequences

quences of a real multiplication of gold and ſilver, without any of the ſubſtantial benefits that, in time of diſtreſs, might ariſe from the poſſeſſion of thoſe metals; and has not our foreign trade been cramped in conſequence of the dearneſs of labour and proviſions?

That our country, for ſeveral years paſt, has been diſpeopling, partly by emigrations, but more particularly in conſequence of the neglect of marriages and the prevailing faſhion of celibacy, is confeſſed and lamented by many judicious and intelligent writers; and the decay of foreign commerce, and the expenſiveneſs of living, are aſſigned as the cauſes of this. Happily, indeed, for us, our emigrants, inſtead of going like the Genoeſe into other countries, have only removed into a different part of our own dominions, where the fatal effects of the exceſſive multiplication of money is not known; and many foreigners having alſo taken up their reſidence in thoſe parts, under the protection of our government, we have, by this new and unexpected reſource, hitherto been enabled to bear up under our domeſtic incumbrances, and to maintain that rank among the European nations which is our due. As poiſon taken into the human body may ſometimes, inſtead of killing, occaſion an evacuation that may contribute to the health of the patient; in like manner our Stockholders, tho' the tendency of their ſchemes has been to exhauſt and ruin the nation, have fortunately been inſtrumental in increaſing its vigour.

But tho' poiſon ſhould from a happy concurrence of circumſtances for once fail in having its natural effect, would not he, who had thus luckily eſcaped, be looked upon as a madman if he ſhould ſtill riſk the taking of large doſes of it. Our trade

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to our colonies has hitherto fortunately ſupplied the loſs of our commerce with foreign ſtates in ſome meaſure; but nevertheleſs if we continue to accumulate our public debts, or neglect purſuing expedients for leſſening them, the nation muſt unavoidably ſoon be debilitated. The artificial multiplication of our money enhancing the price of our manufactures, our coloniſts will, on that account, be in a manner compelled to ſupply themſelves with thoſe commodities made at home, which otherwiſe they would be inclined to take from us. Foreign nations, for the ſame reaſon, have of late turned our competitors in trade, and tho' they may not at firſt be ſo ſkilful as we are, yet the cheapneſs of labour with them, will in the end turn the ballance in their favour, unleſs we purſue ſuch meaſures as may render it eaſy for our labouring people to procure a ſubſiſtence, and conſequently to work for leſs wages. The report of higher wages being given in England than in any other kingdom in Europe, will be far from retaining our manufacturers, or increaſing their number by the acquiſition of foreigners; but will have quite a contrary effect; for the abundance of money in any place is not ſuch a bait to draw new ſettlers, as the eaſineſs of earning a ſubſiſtence. More people go to our colonies in North America, where 'tis ſaid they may ſupport themſelves without money, merely by the products of the earth, than are tempted to go to Barbadoes, where the wages of workmen is ſeven or eight ſhillings a day. Should the commercial competition of our European neighbours prove ſucceſsful, and a ſpirit of emigrating ſeize our manufacturers, what would our boaſted abundance of wealth ſignify, eſpecially as it is not of the genuine kind, like the hoards of gold and ſilver belonging to the Eaſt India

India Nabobs, but is mere treaſures of paper without any intrinſic value. As the plain tendency of the exceſſive multiplication of wealth is to obſtruct population, and to render the baneful influence of luxury more univerſal, wiſe rulers, who wiſh the permanent ſtability of a ſtate, ought to guard againſt it as watchfully as againſt a foreign invader. What then muſt have been the ignorance or knavery of thoſe miniſters, who ſuffered our monied corporations to open upon us a mine of imaginary riches by which they, as proprietors, made ſometimes twenty per cent. while the reſt of their fellow ſubjects, and the public itſelf, were thereby ſo encumbered and diſtreſſed that the nation muſt have been quickly ruined, had not its trade and connections been daily increaſing with a flouriſhing part of its ſubjects ſettled on the continent and iſlands of America.

But let us take a more particular view of the pernicious effects of our artificial wealth, and of the diſtreſſes which the nation has ſuffered, and the dangers which threaten it in conſequence of this imaginary affluence. According to the computation of our moſt judicious writers on commerce, our circulating coin, including even foreign ſpecie, does not exceed ſeventeen millions ſterling *. The currency of paper at the ſame time, including our national debts, amounts to no leſs than 350 millions, that is, for every pound we

* The author does not here mean that this whole quantity of paper is in actual circulation, like ſingle guineas and ſhillings; but that we have created ſuch a ſum of paper ſigns of wealth which are called *current*, becauſe they may be hoarded or transferred, according to the fancy of the proprietor, with as much eaſe and diſpatch as real money. Lands and houſes, on the other hand, are not the ſigns of wealth but real wealth themſelves, and cannot be transferred without the ſigning of deeds, and many tedious formalities.

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have in gold and ſilver we have upwards of twenty pounds in paper. Our circulating coin in gold and ſilver before the beginning of this century was ſaid to have amounted to fifteen millions; ſo that notwithſtanding our flouriſhing trade for theſe ſeventy years paſt, the quantity of our real ſpecie has but increaſed two millions; nay ſome very judicious writers allege, that it has not increaſed half a million. That the balance of our trade, ſince the revolution, has brought in many millions of gold and ſilver is an undoubted truth; but the people of this iſland, inſtead of being poſſeſſors of greater quantities of thoſe precious metals now, than at the former period, have actually been ſtripped, without their perceiving it, of all the real ſpecie they were then in poſſeſſion of, as they are become debtors to foreign nations for the whole of it, and for many millions beſides. Such have been the pernicious conſequences of funding and jobbing. Cæſar, in his account of the ancient Britons, ſays, that they had no gold and ſilver money among them, and the ſame with the greateſt truth may be ſaid of the modern Britons, were our foreign creditors to be faithfully and honeſtly paid that part of the national debt owing to them, which on the loweſt computation, is ſuppoſed to amount to near thirty millions. We ſhould not, 'tis true, even in this caſe, be wholly without gold and other precious effects; for it is computed by ſome that the bullion, plate, and diamonds in the nation, excluſive of other rich commodities, amount to the value of twenty millions ſterling, tho' by others they are not eſtimated ſo high. But had we not moſt imprudently ſuffered intereſted men to multiply upon us imaginary riches, the quantity of our bullion, plate, diamonds, &c. muſt neceſſarily have been by this time much greater

than it is, even tho' the ballance of trade in our favour ſince the revolution, had been one half leſs than it has been computed; and none will deny but that treaſures of this kind in reſerve are infinitely preferable to thoſe of paper, which threaten us every moment with ſome violent convulſion. Had the iſſue of the war been as unfavourable to us as it has been to the French (and that it has happened otherwiſe, has apparently been more owing to the favour of Providence than to any ſuperiority of our natural ſtrength) in all probability our public credit would have failed before this time, and the conſequences of our bankruptcy would have been much more fatal to us, than what followed among the French upon their bankruptcy, was to them. Their large hoards of plate turned into circulation by the mint, in ſome meaſure, ſupplied the deficiency of their coin, which was not artificially increaſed by a large paper currency; whereas our plate, tho' turned to the ſame purpoſes, would bear but a very ſmall proportion in ſupplying the general deficiency that would be felt, upon the ſudden annihilation of all our paper money; and what would be the diſtreſs of the nation in ſuch circumſtances is eaſier to be conceived than expreſſed. A ſhip that is wholly compoſed of ſound timbers may be ſtranded and got off again with little damage; but a veſſel which for every ſound timber has ten or a dozen rotten ones will no ſooner ſtrike on a bank than ſhe will break to pieces.

But ſuppoſing that the hazard of a bankruptcy ſhould be very remote, are not the inconveniencies ariſing from the national debt ſo very conſiderable as to call aloud for the reforming hand of the legiſlature? The exceſſive abundance of imaginary ſpecie has had the effect of an actual increaſe

of real wealth, by altering the proportion that formerly ſubſiſted between merchandize and money. Thus the price of all commodities has been enhanced, which has diſtreſſed individuals, cramped the national trade, and leſſened the exertive vigour of the ſtate; for the ſame taxes cannot now perform the ſame ſervices as formerly, ſince many articles of conſumption have crept up to more than double their former prices.

The intereſt paid by the nation annually to our ſtockholders exceeds three millions ſterling, which is more than five ſhillings in the pound of the computed rent of all the lands in England; thus the landed gentlemen find themſelves encumbered with a mortgage upon their eſtates of more than one fourth of their yearly income. The additional expences of the ſtate during a war, have ſometimes not much exceeded three millions, ſo that conſidering theſe three millions of intereſt, raiſed upon the people, and paid into the pockets of private perſons, as a ſubſidy almoſt ſufficient for the ſupport of a war, the nation has in a manner been carrying on two wars at once. And, indeed, it is evident that the greateſt enemies we have had during this war are ourſelves, or rather our ſtockholders; for ſuppoſing the public were at liberty to uſe the three millions appropriated for the payment of their intereſt as ſupplies for a war, and the prices of our manufactures were leſſened in conſequence of the annihilation of the greateſt part of our paper money, the nation would with a very little exertion be able to raiſe almoſt all the ſupplies within the year, and in this caſe could have carried on ſuch a war as the preſent for twenty years, and proſpered under it. But we could not with the ſame ſucceſs contend againſt our monied men; for if the war had continued

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two or three years longer, and our arms had ſtill been ſucceſsful againſt our foreign enemies, the nation nevertheleſs would have been ſo exhauſted by its domeſtic enemies, that we ſhould have been obliged to conclude a peace upon any terms with the former, to get ſome reſpite from the dangerous encroachments made upon the national property by the latter.

The Dutch carried on a war with the powerful Spaniſh monarchy for forty years; but having no ſuperfluity of artificial wealth to check their induſtry at home, and eſtimating the charge of the war, for the moſt part, according to their abilities, they annually increaſed in ſtrength and vigour, and at length obliged their once formidable enemy to grant them an honourable peace. Lewis XII. of France was engaged in war during his whole reign, a period of no leſs than ſeventeen years, yet left no incumbrances upon his people at his death. Edward III. of England carried on very expenſive wars both at home and abroad, during a great part of his long and glorious reign; yet ſuch was the wiſdom of the maxims he purſued in regard to the domeſtic policy of his kingdom, that his ſubjects having no heavy ſubſidies to pay to private companies, were able to furniſh annually the large ſupplies neceſſary for the ſupport of the ſtate, the trade of the nation at the ſame time flouriſhing in a greater degree than it ever had done before in any period. In thoſe days it would ſeem that the public's real ability was made the meaſure of the national expence, and that private men were not ſuffered to prey upon the people's induſtry, by claiming intereſt for loans of imaginary wealth. Were not the revenues of the nation at preſent ſo deeply mortgaged, we ſhould need no other reſources, beſides the annual

ſupplies that might be raiſed upon the public to enable us to ſet the utmoſt efforts of the French at defiance. Conſidering the preſent unanimity and vigorous ſtrength of the nation, and the warm and zealous affection of all ranks to our patriot king, an invaſion from the French could not be more formidable to us now, than the famous armada of Philip II. was to England alone in the glorious reign of Elizabeth. The views of our monied men, however, ſince they have felt the ſweets of trafficking with the government, have been to divert the nation from exerting itſelf according to its real and natural ſtrength, and to perſuade us to meaſure the extent of our power by the extent of our credit. They have profeſſed themſelves devoted to the miniſtry, and cloaking their intereſted deſigns with that honourable pretence, they have been always forward to ſupply the wants of the public by the way of a loan, which has been the fatal cauſe of that facility the nation has met with in plunging itſelf into debt, and laviſhing its real wealth in the moſt profuſe and inconſiderate manner.

For theſe many years paſt immenſe ſubſidies in time of war, and conſiderable ones in time of peace, have been paid by us to foreign potentates, which ſubſidies if they were all to be reckoned up in one ſum, would be double or triple the amount of the whole gold and ſilver coin in the nation. If the ballance of our trade, during this period, had been ſo great as to have ſupplied thoſe large ſums with ſome remaining overplus for ourſelves, ſuch a diverſion of our ſuperfluous wealth would have been no detriment to the ſtate, as we ſhould thereby have been freed from the inconveniencies attending a too great abundance of money, and would have ſtill had a quantity of real coin ſufficient

cient for all the purpoſes of commerce. But that we have given away to our foreign allies, and ſpent in foreign connections, not the exuberances of our wealth, but actually more than the whole of it, is evident from this, that the debt we at preſent owe to foreigners exceeds the total amount of our gold and ſilver coin by ſeveral millions.

An opinion, however, has been induſtriouſly propagated, that the largeneſs of the ſums we borrow is a proof of our riches, as they are furniſhed to the ſtate chiefly by our own ſubjects, and to have individuals, who, from the exuberance of the profits of trade, can ſupply the government one year with ſeven millions, another year with ten, and another with twelve, &c. at the low intereſt of three or four per cent. is a certain proof that we are the moſt wealthy nation in the univerſe. But if we conſider this ſcheme of money lending a little more narrowly, we ſhall find that our large loans are not ſo much a proof of our wealth, as of our fondneſs for building upon the airy foundation of credit, and having recourſe to expeditious reſources, ſuggeſted from mercenary views. Thoſe who are moſt concerned in real commerce traffic leaſt with the public; yet 'tis pretended that the ſums lent to the government are paid in hard money, and ariſe from the annual profits of trade, great part of which profits, in ſome miraculous manner, come into the poſſeſſion of a ſet of no-merchants, who are diſtinguiſhed by the title of the monied men. Suppoſe even one half of the trade of the nation were carried on by theſe monied men, if their profits in three or four years could amount to thirty millions, the profits of our whole trade would be ſixty millions, which allowing 12 per cent. on an average for the gain of the trade would have required the ſtock to have amounted

amounted to the value of no leſs than 500 millions. The bare mention of the extent of trade required to raiſe theſe pretended profits, is a ſufficient demonſtration of the abſurdity of ſuch a ſuppoſition. Nay, if inſtead of twenty or thirty monied men, undertaking to ſupply the Government with 12 millions, all the thriving men of the kingdom, ſhould agree to lend their annual ſavings to the ſtate, it is evident, that the aggregate of the whole would not make the ſum of 12 millions.

The plenty of our money then, is not the fund that ſupplies our loans to the government, but the abundance of ſomething elſe, which cuſtom has made faſhionable to be taken for money; and the privilege of coining this artificial ſpecie, is monopolized by a ſmall number of men, to the detriment of the whole community. The practice of borrowing and funding, which has been repeated year after year, during the courſe of our four laſt wars, has gradually drained the nation of more than its whole ſtock of gold and ſilver in ſpecie, notwithſtanding the recruits we have received from the large balance of our active trade; and has diſtreſſed us with a ſuperfluous abundance of nominal wealth, which, by enhancing the expence of living, has raiſed the price of our manufactures, and conſequently leſſened the ſale of them.

Our paper-money being multiplied upon us without ceaſing, ſoon drove gold and ſilver out of the large tranſactions in trade, and, in theſe, their abſence was not much felt, as bills were found of eaſier and readier conveyance, and the knaviſh art of dealing in bills without any fund not being then invented, all bills, in circulation, were ſuppoſed to have an equivalent in gold and ſilver,

or in commodities lodged ſomewhere. The real ſpecie being thus turned to the daily and weekly circulation, in ſmall affairs, the nation ſeemed to overflow with a general abundance of it; but the prices of things thereupon advancing, more of it became neceſſary, to purchaſe the ſame quantity of commodities, and immenſe ſums, at the ſame time, being ſtill ſent out of the kingdom, and their place ſupplied with more paper, ſmall bills at length began to make their appearance, in minute payments, and in the leſſer tranſactions of traffic; and of late, it is a common complaint, that real ſpecie, with the utmoſt difficulty, can be found to anſwer thoſe bills*. To divert the general murmuring, and lull our ſuſpicions, we are told, that it is the wicked Jews, who export great part of our ſilver, on account of the profit they make by exchanging it for gold; and that another great part of it is hoarded by the bank, to enable them to ward off any large and ſudden demand. But whether this fully accounts for the almoſt total want of ſmall ſpecie in circulation, and for the ſcarcity of gold as well as ſilver, I leave it to any readers of common ſagacity to determine. Our money-lenders have treated the nation in the ſame manner as Dr. Sangrado treated his patients; they have drained off all its blood, and ſupplied the place of that vital fluid with plenty of water, and, though the ſtate has been far from proſpering, in conſequence of their preſcriptions, their fees have nevertheleſs been

* A letter a few months ago, from Birmingham, mentions, that caſh, both gold and ſilver, is ſo ſcarce there, that they are obliged to take two and a half *per cent.* diſcount, for very good bills within a fortnight of being due; and even to allow a diſcount, of one half *per cent.* to get change for bank notes.

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moſt unconſcionable. In former times they have been reckoned at 40 and 30 *per cent*; but of late years, they have ſunk conſiderably, though they are ſtill too burdenſom for an exhauſted ſtate to bear.

As it is the good faith of the parliament alone, that ſupports the credit of our monied companies, why ſhould the legiſlative power be diffident of its own credit upon its own bottom, by which the commonwealth might be ſupported without the aſſiſtance of thoſe quacks, who aſſume the name of monied men. Why may not the parliament, in caſe of need, inſtead of borrowing the credit of others, iſſue bills upon its own credit, which bills would be equally convenient in domeſtic traffic, as thoſe of private men, and might eaſily circulate in the nation to a great amount, if there was money depoſited at an office, under their direction, to be always ready to anſwer any occaſional demands.

Beſides the inconveniences already mentioned, flowing from the abundance of our imaginary wealth, there is another, the ſecret, though fatal influence of which ſeems hitherto to have been in a great meaſure overlooked. The exceſſive dearneſs of labour, commodities, and proviſions, in this kingdom, is attributed to the great number of our taxes, which, it is ſaid, have ſo raiſed the price of all our manufactures, as to diminiſh the ſale of them among foreign nations. Now, I doubt not but upon reflection it will appear, that the high price of every thing, is not ſo much owing to our numerous taxes, as to our ſeeming plenty of money; and that, if the greateſt part of our artificial ſpecie were annihilated, manufactures, labour, and proviſions, would become much cheaper than they are at preſent, and the

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nation could ſtill raiſe the ſame taxes without being more burdened than they are now. If money, or the ſigns of money, are in great plenty in a ſtate, it ſinks in value, in proportion to that plenty. If we look back a little more than 200 years *, we ſhall find our kings meeting with as much difficulty then, in raiſing 10,000 pounds, as now in raiſing a million, ſuch was the ſcarcity of gold and ſilver in Europe, before the Spaniards had conquered the Weſt Indies and Peru. The ſmall quantity, however, the princes had of thoſe metals, ſerved all the purpoſes of our preſent abundance; they carried on great undertakings, and engaged in long and obſtinate wars, if not without burdening, yet, at leaſt, without exhauſting their ſubjects.

The whole taxes raiſed, during the 44 years of the reign of Elizabeth, are ſaid, not to have exceeded 6 millions; but, in thoſe days, many burdenſome and expenſive military ſervices, were performed by the counties, and by private perſons, and the charges of them not reckoned in the national eſtimate; yet probably, (as there was then no ſtanding army, and the royal navy was but inconſiderable) the laſt kind of expences were as high as thoſe eſtimated in parliament. Beſides, the land revenue of that Queen, excluſive of the wards and dutchy of Lancaſter, amounted to 188,197 *l.* 4 *s.* *per annum*, which, in 44 years, makes 8,280,676 *l.* 16 *s.* ſo that the whole charges of government, during that reign, may be reckoned above 20 millions. This appears a ſmall ſum in compariſon of the taxes, that have been raiſed theſe 44 years paſt in Great Britain; yet if the obſervations of the celebrated Monteſquieu

* See the reign of Henry VII.

are juſt, the real diſproportion betwixt the ſums raiſed in the two different periods will not be very conſiderable. " Itwas not long, he ſays, after " the conqueſt of Mexico and Peru, before the " ſpecie of Europe was doubled; this appeared " from the price of commodities which every " where was doubled. As the ſpecie of Europe " doubled, the profit of Spain diminiſhed in the " ſame proportion, and they had every year the " ſame quantity of metals, which was become " by one half leſs precious. In double the time " the ſpecie ſtill doubled, and the profit ſtill di- " miniſhed another half. If we proceed thus " doubling and doubling, we ſhall find, in this " progreſſion, the cauſe and impotency of the " wealth of Spain. It is about 200 years ſince " they began to work their Indian mines, and I " ſuppoſe the quantity of the ſpecie at preſent, " in the trading world, is to that before the diſ- " covery of the Indies, as 32 to 1; that is, it " has been doubled five times. In 200 years " more, the ſame quantity will be to that before " the diſcovery, as 64 to 1; that is, it will be " doubled once more". *l'Eſprit de Loix* l. 21.

Monteſquieu ſpeaks of the real ſpecie; but if we include alſo the nominal coin, by which the quantity of our money is ſeemingly increaſed, this nation may be accounted 50 times more wealthy now, than it was in the days of Elizabeth. In this caſe, conſidering the proportionable value of the different ſums, the taxes raiſed, during that reign, were as chargeable to England, as all the taxes that have been raiſed theſe 44 years paſt have been to Great Britain. It is of the greateſt importance to a ſtate to have plenty of money; but, it is likewiſe extremely prejudical to it, to have twice or thrice as much as all its neighbours. If

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the quantity of ſpecie in Europe, in general, is to that before the diſcovery of the Indies, as 32 to 1; we might very well content ourſelves to have the quantity of ſpecie, in this iſland, as 40 to 1: and if our circulating ſpecie were reduced to that proportion, by the annihilation of the greateſt part of our paper-money, the nation, ſuppoſing it diſincumbred of its debts, could raiſe as great taxes as the preſent, without being burdened ſo much as it now is, in conſequence of the moſt impolitic practice of borrowing and funding. The ſucceſſes and advantages of a war, loſe much of their ſolidity, while we bring upon ourſelves a yearly debt, higher than all the revenues of all our conqueſts. I queſtion not, but that Edward III. or Queen Elizabeth, would have looked upon victories purchaſed in ſuch a manner, as real defeats.

During this war there has been added to the national currency upwards of 30 millions of paper ſpecie, which has rendered our money ſeemingly more plentiful, and conſequently leſſened its value in the ſame degree; and there has been likewiſe added a million to our taxes. The firſt of theſe incumbrances, though generally overlooked, is almoſt as heavy as the ſecond; and both of them are for a perpetuity unleſs redeemed. Now, to conſider the increaſe of the taxes alone, one million in perpetuity, it muſt be acknowleged, is a much heavier burden, than even three or four millions of extraordinary ſupplies, raiſed during the continuance of a war, and ceaſing entirely upon a peace. But, inſtead of one million, our paſſion for borrowing, which has been fatally nurſed by our monied men, has at length burdened us with more than three millions in perpetuity. If the nation had exerted itſelf in an extraordinary

manner, during the ſhort continuance of a war, the public, at this day, would not have been burdened with theſe three millions; but, by falſely aiming at making the burden of a war be little felt, we have, at length, burdened ourſelves with the expence of a perpetual war. But even ſuppoſing the public could eaſily afford to raiſe the ſums neceſſary, for diſcharging the yearly intereſt of the debts; the diſpoſing of ſuch immenſe ſums in that manner, is nevertheleſs extremely prejudical to the kingdom. How different would be the ſtate of the nation, if theſe three millions, that are paid annually to ſtockholders, to ſupport them without induſtry, were beſtowed as bounties to further the advancement of our manufactures?

Can any good reaſon be aſſigned, why our lawgivers ought not to eſtabliſh it, as a law to themſelves, to make the preſent abilities of the people, the meaſure of the national expence? or, if they ſhould borrow an inconſiderable part of it in time of war, why they ſhould not continue the taxes, during peace, till that part be wholly cleared off? To iſſue a million of artificial ſpecie, during a war, would not be attended with much inconvenience, as trade, which at that time meets with many incumbrances, requires ſome artificial reſources to give it freſh vigour; but, till that debt is cleared off, there is a neceſſity for continuing the taxes even during a peace.

To anticipate our revenues, to prevent other potentates from anticipating theirs, is a moſt romantic ſtrain of generoſity. We have, in conſequence of many engagements involved ourſelves in a debt of, at leaſt, 40 millions, in ſerving the houſe of Auſtria; but, has that family contracted ſuch a heavy debt, in ſerving itſelf? The territories

ritories of that auguſt houſe have, more than once, been protected, by the treaſures and blood of Britons. We have ſaved its towns, and prevented it from mortgaging its revenue, by mortgaging our own; yet we cannot prodnce any returns of gratitude or acknowlegement, unleſs we think ourſelves, in ſome meaſure, repaid by a letter of the Empreſs to our late magnanimous king, thanking him for expoſing his life in her ſervice. Queen Elizabeth, for the aſſiſtance ſhe gave the Dutch, laid them under an obligation of returning ſome ſolid acknowlegement, by ſtipulating, to keep poſſeſſion of four or five of their chief towns, till ſhe ſhould be reimburſed the charge ſhe had been at on their account. In all probability, the French have acted in the ſame manner in their preſent alliance with Auſtria, and have taken the towns in Flanders, as a depoſite for the ſubſidies they ſhould be obliged to give to the Empreſs. Allowing that the wants of our allies are ſometimes ſo very preſſing, as to render it neceſſary for us, to pay pecuniary ſubſidies to them in time of war, prudence, however, would dictate, that if we muſt borrow thoſe ſums ourſelves, the prince we give them to, ought to become bound, at leaſt, for the intereſt of them. When we borrow money, we are obliged to mortgage part of our revenues to pay the annual intereſt; and if we can raiſe large ſums by that means, could not our German allies, in the neceſſity of their affairs, have done the ſame by mortgaging the revenues of Moravia, of part of Flanders, of Eaſt Frieſland, or of any other province, which would have obliged them, inſtead or ſticking to us like bloodſuckers, to have been good managers, and to have bridled their ambition, till they had redeemed thoſe pledges. The

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mortgaging of taxes, and the mortgaging of provinces comes to the ſame thing in the end; for by our continued borrowing and funding what elſe have we done than mortgaged the richeſt province of the Britiſh empire, namely the county of Middleſex, the whole revenues of which, including thoſe of the capital city, are not ſufficient to pay the yearly intereſt of the public debts. While we are ſo very generous as not to ſcruple new and larger mortgages every ſucceeding year, to raiſe ſuch ſubſidies as ſhould prevent our allies from mortgaging any of their territories, it is no wonder that their rapacity ſhould riſe in the ſame proportion as our generoſity. The demands of our allies could not have been ſo immoderate as we have felt them to be, if they had been once convinced that our rulers had made it a law to themſelves, to limit the annual national expence to the real abilities of the people, and if their indolence, ambition, and extravagance * had not been fed by us, in all probability they would, on many occaſions, have exerted themſelves more, or been leſs refractory in agreeing to reaſonable terms of peace.

The public debts are productive of another great evil to the ſtate. The uſurious profits of the money-lenders having been repeated without mea-

* The Imperialiſts in 1702, undertook the ſiege of Landau; but their army was ſo ill ſupplied, that they were obliged to ſuſpend the military operations ſome weeks, for want of ammunition, the money which ought to have furniſhed the neceſſaries of the ſiege, having been expended in providing a magnificent equipage and retinue for the king of the Romans, who came in a great parade to the camp to have the honour of taking the place. The ſubſidies the Imperialiſts received from us no doubt encouraged them to ſquander their treaſure in that vain and needleſs pomp, which is ſaid to have thrown all their affairs into diſorder.

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ſure, have concentered a great part of the national wealth into the hands of a few men, who by their ſuddenly acquired fortunes promote the growth of luxury in the capital where they generally reſide, while in the remote parts of the kingdom, trade languiſhes for want of a ſufficient circulation. The perpetual fluctuation of the funds is like a market where the price of things is perpetually varying, and as this fluctuation is chiefly influenced by the tricks and falſe alarms of the money-jobbers, it affords a fine field for their knavery to exerciſe itſelf in, by buying at an under-rate and ſelling at an exorbitant profit. Thus great part of the national wealth, which ought to be employed in trade, is diverted from that channel of honeſt induſtry, and uſed in an uſurious traffic; a traffic which preys upon the profits of the induſtrious. The diſtribution of the wealth of a ſtate in a juſt meaſure, is as neceſſary to its proſperity, as the proper diſtribution of the blood is to the health of the human body; but the riches of this nation cannot be ſaid to be duly diſtributed, when a few men, without following commerce, or carrying on large manufactures, acquire immenſe eſtates, while, on the other hand, the number of thoſe who are ſupported by public charity daily increaſes. 'Tis computed we have about ſeventeen millions of real ſpecie in this iſland, and near eight millions of inhabitants, which is about two pounds for each individual. Suppoſing one million of the inhabitants, or one eighth of the whole, to be poſſeſſed of one half of the national wealth, and the other half to be divided among the remaining ſeven millions of people, the ſtate might perhaps feel no inconvenience from this diſtribution, but however it might be, 'tis plain that its condition would be much worſe if 200,000,

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or one fortieth of the inhabitants ſhould acquire the poſſeſſion of three fourths of the national wealth. Our money-lenders, however, by their artifices have increaſed the inequality to a ſtill higher degree. The number of the public creditors or ſtockholders is ſuppoſed not to exceed 17,000, yet this ſmall number of perſons, among whom muſt be ſeveral foreigners, are proprietors of upwards of an hundred millions ſterling, which is more than one fourth of the whole national currency in ſpecie and paper united. Our monied men in conſequence of their ſucceſsful engroſſing ſo large a proportion of the national wealth, have, ſince the beginnning of this century, been regarded by thoſe in power as the chief pillars of the ſtate; and of late years they have affected a kind of priority in reſpect of the landed gentlemen, who by many are now reckoned only in the ſecondary claſs of ſubjects. The monied intereſt in parlimentary conteſts, has already often ſhewn itſelf to be the prevalent intereſt, many of the landed gentlemen being ſo far ſeduced, as to betray their own cauſe, and zealouſly to ſupport the intereſted ſchemes of their worſt enemies. As our monied men alſo have long had acceſs to the miniſters of ſtate, it may be queſtioned whether, during a corrupt adminiſtration, they have not ſwayed the national councils, ſo as to render them ſubſervient to their private views. Suppoſing all our monied companies united into one, which 'tis ſaid, was once in agitation, their influence would no doubt increaſe; and as views of profit might render them the tools of a miniſtry, they would, in that caſe, under a prince of a deſpotic temper, be more dangerous inſtruments in enſlaving a nation than a numerous army of mercenary troops. As vigour and unanimity are now reſtored to our

national councils, and we have a king who has already manifeſted the integrity of his diſpoſition, by expreſſing his diſapprobation of governing by unconſtitutional means, we could not certainly wiſh for a more favourable conjuncture to ceaſe enlarging our public debts, and to think of effectual expedients for leſſening them.

To conclude, it is univerſally allowed that a nation never flouriſhes while the property of all the lands is engroſſed by a few great men, which is generally the caſe in infant ſtates; but its proſperity is equally blaſted when the money is engroſſed by a few, more eſpecially when thoſe few reſide in one ſpot, and have no intereſt or connections in the remote parts of the kingdom. That wiſe and politic prince Henry VII. laid the foundation of our preſent liberties and grandeur, by breaking the land monopolies, and I doubt not but from what has been ſaid, it will appear that there is as urgent a neceſſity at this time for putting a check to the monopolizers of our ſpecie.

To ſome, who have never thoroughly examined the dangerous conſequences of our national debts, the preſent extenſiveneſs of our trade appears an infallible demonſtration, that our affairs are in a moſt proſperous condition, and that we have nothing to fear from our internal incumbrances, ſince we actually find that they do not hinder new channels of wealth from daily opening to us. I ſhall beſtow a few words in ſhewing the fallacy of this concluſion. As the general conſumption of all the nations in Europe, and the colonies depending upon them, may be ſuppoſed to remain about its uſual extent, the increaſe of our trade will be chiefly owing to the decreaſe of the trade of other ſtates, or to ſome forced circulation at home. Let us conſider what nations have in-

creaſed their commerce, or formed ſuch eſtabliſhments as tend to increaſe it, and what ſtates have loſt part of the trade they formerly poſſeſſed. The trade of the Turks and Italians may be ſuppoſed neither more nor leſs vigorous or languid, than it has been for many years paſt; only we find ſome efforts to promote trade in Sicily by the eſtabliſhment of a chamber of commerce at Meſſina in 1751. The trade of the Spaniards is allowed to have increaſed very conſiderably ſince the commencement of this war; and as a commercial ſpirit is beginning to prevail in that nation, they are likely, not only to retain what they have acquired, but alſo to augment it. The French, who, before the war, had an extenſive commerce, a moſt flouriſhing fiſhery, and a great number of ſhips, have been intirely ſtripped of their fiſhery, and have loſt almoſt all their ſhips; but it would doubtleſs be forming too haſty a concluſion to affirm that their trade is entirely ruined, and that the means of re-eſtabliſhing it are irretriveably cut off. Their wines, their cambrics, &c. find their way even into this iſland notwithſtanding the war; and what interruption, can the Danes, the Dutch, the Spaniards, the Swedes, Ruſſians, &c. meet with in carrying home goods bought in France not contraband, to their reſpective countries. The French inland trade to Germany, Spain, Italy, and Holland, which is very conſiderable, cannot in the leaſt be interrupted by our cruiſers. Doubtleſs the French are great ſufferers in the loſs of their fiſhery, in the loſs of their ſhipping, which deprives them of the advantage of freightage, and in the loſs of Guadaloupe, Canada, &c. but as their country has not been the ſeat of war, it would be unreaſonable to ſuppoſe that their internal trade had been wholly interrupted. According to their

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own writers, *la Bagatelle eſt le reſource des François*; their trade in toys alone is of great importance to them. But allowing the diminution of their trade to be exceeding great, it can only be looked upon as temporary; for we may as well ſuppoſe that the trees, which have no leaves in winter will never ſprout again, as imagine that the French, who have great numbers of expert manufacturers, and moſt prudent regulations for the conducting of commerce, will not quickly recover a very conſiderable trade, if their commodities are offered to market cheaper than ours. Tho' they ſhould not for the future be allowed to fiſh in the American ſeas, yet if we indolently neglect the fiſhery on our own coaſts, which might prove to us a moſt fruitful nurſery of hardy ſailors, we may perhaps in a few years ſee the coaſts of Iceland crouded with French fiſhing veſſels, in conſequence of a treaty between them and the king of Denmark. It may then be allowed that the war has been extremely detrimental to the French trade; but it muſt alſo be granted that their commerce is far from being plucked up by the roots, and that it will undoubtedly revive again upon the return of a peace. As Germany has been miſerably haraſſed for theſe five years paſt by numerous armies, its trade and manufactures muſt conſequently be greatly diminiſhed; but its imperial cities being in a manner unconnected with the quarrel of the princes, and ſome provinces having but ſlightly felt the miſeries of the war, trade, in all probability, has been carried on more briſkly than uſual in theſe laſt exempted places, as the immenſe ſums of gold and ſilver ſent thither to ſupport the troops, would greatly quicken the demand for their manufactures. At the return of a peace, therefore, many German merchants

will be in poſſeſſion of large ſums, which will gradually circulate thro' the country, and ſoon reſtore their trade to its former ballance. Our trade in the mean time has doubtleſs gained by the decay of theirs, and that of the French; but it has received no augmentation at the expence of the Dutch or the Danes, for the commerce of both theſe nations, as well as of the Spaniards, has been enlarged ſince the breaking out of the war. If the Swedes and Ruſſians have not greatly increaſed their trade, yet they have formed ſuch regulations as tend to enlarge it at our expence, by encouraging the eſtabliſhment of new manufactures of various kinds. In Ruſſia particularly they have begun to carry on ſeveral manufactures of woollen cloth; and a few months ago we find that a new council of commerce was inſtituted at Peterſburgh. The devaſtations in Germany, the conqueſt of the French colonies, and the loſs of their ſhipping are then, in reſpect of other nations, the chief cauſes of our preſent increaſed trade, but theſe are merely temporary, excepting that ariſing from the conqueſts which ſhall be retained by us at the peace.

The preſent increaſe of our trade, however, is more owing to ſome cauſes operating within ourſelves, than to any great diminution of the trade of France and Germany, and theſe cauſes alſo muſt ceaſe at a peace. The large ſums of money carried out to America, to ſupply the exigences of the war on that continent, have occaſioned more than an ordinary conſumption and circulation among our coloniſts, and conſequently increaſed their demands for the manufactures and commodities of the mother country; but when the war is concluded, this channel in a great meaſure will be ſhut up. The materials for our land

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and naval armaments are extremely expenſive, and ſo far as they are raiſed and fabricated at home, they give employment to great numbers of manufacturers, and increaſe our internal traffic; but ſo far as we are obliged to purchaſe them of the Swedes or Ruſſians, the commerce, tho' it may occaſion ſome ſtir, can ſcarcely be called advantagious. However great our internal trade may be in conſequence of the demand for warlike ſtores of all kinds; yet 'tis evident that when the war ceaſes that muſt alſo ceaſe. The laſt extraordinary ſource of our increaſed trade, and which indeed is the primary fountain from whence all the other ſources are ſupplied, is the annual multiplication of our paper money in conſequence of the loans to the government. This ſource from which we have drawn imaginary millions yearly will be entirely ſhut up at the peace, and it is for the benefit of the nation that it ſhould be ſo; for tho' in times of neceſſity it gives a temporary relief, yet its remote effects are ſure to occaſion great langour and weakneſs, if we do not anticipate them by a ſpeedy recourſe to the natural means of ſubſiſtence. This artificial ſupport is like lime laid to the root of a tree, which by ſuch cultivation may for two or three years yield plentiful forced crops, but if the lime were to be annually augmented, the tree inſtead of proſpering would wither and die, tho' it might have lived for ages, if it had been ſupplied with nouriſhment that was natural to it. The Spaniards when their plate fleets brought them home annually ſeveral millions of ſilver from America, no doubt rejoiced greatly at the increaſe of their ſpecie, which ſerved as a fund for the expences of their ambitious princes, and enabled private perſons to turn greater conſumers, that is, to purchaſe greater quantities of all kinds of foreign

reign commodities, and to live in an idle and luxurious manner. Thoſe who did not conſider diſtant conſequences, probably concluded that their nation was becoming every day more formidable, and would ſoon be able to give law to all Europe; but the event quickly ſhewed that the rapid increaſe of their wealth had only ſerved to exhauſt and enervate them. If two or three millions of ſilver flowing in annually upon the Spaniards without any exertion of induſtry on their part, proved in the end extremely prejudicial to them, ought not we to be alarmed at the annual influx of three or four millions of artificial ſpecie, which as to its remote effects deadens trade, while at the ſame time it gives freſh vigour to luxury. During a war indeed it might be allowable to iſſue annually one million of artificial ſpecie to prevent the ſtagnation of trade which then meets with many obſtructions; but as has already been mentioned, the taxes ought not to be leſſened during a peace, till the incumbrance contracted during the war be entirely cleared off, otherwiſe any advantage that accrued from it to the ſtate, will be overballanced by the detriment received from it afterwards.

The chief cauſes of our increaſed trade appearing to be all temporary, and ſome of them even to be of a hurtful tendency, its preſent vigour would ſeem but a weak foundation for boaſting of the nation's proſperity, while we find moſt of our European neighbours daily eſtabliſhing new manufactures, and barring the entrance of ours into their dominions by unfriendly prohibitions, and ſome even by peremptory excluſions.

If we continue inattentive to the fatal conſequences of the heavy national incumbrances, which have greatly enhanced the prices of our manufactures, and conſequently encouraged foreigners

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to rival us; if no means are thought of for promoting the nation's ſolid intereſt, by putting a bit in the mouths of our money-mongers; by eaſing the people of the annual tribute they pay to private perſons; by turning their views to ſuch methods of advancing their fortunes as are conſiſtent with the public welfare, and by countenancing thoſe who have the boldneſs to ſtem the tide of corruption and venality, our preſent puffy greatneſs, however flattering its appearance, may juſtly be compared to the ſhewy ſplendor of a ſoap bubble, and may quickly be ſucceeded by a moſt enervating debility.

The preſent vigorous exertion of the nation, I allow, ſeems far from boding ſuch a reverſe of fortune; but a ſtate as well as a human body, by preſuming too far upon its activity and over-exerting its natural ſtrength, may contract a moſt dangerous diſtemper, tho' the effects of that diſtemper may not appear till a conſiderable time after the cauſe operated. The Spaniards in the reign of their monarch Philip II. aſtoniſhed all Europe with their affluence, their numerous and well diſciplined armies, and their moſt formidable fleets; and who, in thoſe days, would have believed that ſuch a diſplay and exertion of ſtrength was a prelude to almoſt two centuries of languor and weakneſs; yet ſuch we have found it has actually proved.

The French during the long period of the reign of Lewis XIV. had raiſed their power and greatneſs to ſuch a degree, as ſingly to diſpute the ſovereignty of the ſea with the two moſt formidable naval powers of Europe united, and to baffle the utmoſt efforts of many powerful ſtates leagued againſt them. But their ambitious monarch having a pride in enlarging his territories, without

ever reckoning on the expence either of blood or treaſure, went on augmenting the charges of his government, increaſing his armies, and accumulating his debts, till at length he exhauſted the natural ſtrength of his dominions, and introduced as much miſery into his kingdom as if it had been ravaged by a victorious enemy. His dominions being enlarged with ſome new acquiſitions of territory, and numerous armies being maintained in the field by him to the laſt, the miſery of his kingdom was only looked upon as temporary; and it was generally concluded that the French in conſequence of his conqueſts had eſtabliſhed their power more firmly than ever. Their miſery ſo far as it regarded a want of ſubſiſtence among the poorer ſort was indeed only temporary; and it may be allowed that no people recruit ſlight misfortunes more ſpeedily than the French; but the exceſſive deſtruction of men, and waſte of treaſure, the great diminution of trade, and the incumbrances upon the ſtate in conſequence of the anticipation of its revenues, and the great number of placemen and annuitants, ſunk the whole kingdom into difficulties and diſtreſſes, which have at length ſo weakened and enervated them, that at this day they are not able to bear the expence of naval armaments, and cannot even ſupport land expeditions in ſuch a manner as to render them formidable to one ſtate, much leſs to a grand alliance.

As the heavy incumbrances brought upon the Spaniards and French by the impolitic ambition of Philip II. and Lewis XIV. have been the chief cauſes of the preſent debility of thoſe kingdoms, have not we the juſteſt reaſon to dread the conſequences of our enormous encumbrances, eſpecially as they are larger in proportion to the greatneſs

neſs of this ſtate, than thoſe which exhauſted the ſtrength of France and Spain.

The nation ſeems arrived at a moſt intereſting criſis, and probably peace will either ſoon introduce languor and decay, in conſequence of the commercial rivalſhip of all our neighbours, or if care is taken to eaſe us at home, we ſhall ſee more vigorous exertions than ever in every part of the iſland, and not only new manufactures eſtabliſhed, but new lands brought into cultivation, and new buildings carried on in all our cities and towns. The heavy national debts plainly threaten us with the former; but when we reflect that we are at preſent bleſſed with a virtuous king, and an uncorrupt and ſtrenuous adminiſtration, we have the greateſt reaſon to expect the latter, eſpecially as expedients now offer themſelves for clearing off the public debts, which would have been impracticable ſixty years ago; and Britain, ſince its colonies are become ſo populous and extenſive, may be regarded as the head of a vaſt empire, which can ſubſiſt and be very powerful without depending ſolely upon the precarious ſupport of foreign commerce.

While England was more burdened than profited by its American colonies, and was ſtraitened on the North by the rival kingdom of Scotland, the chief ſource of its wealth and power conſiſted in its advantageous traffic with foreign nations. But as Great Britain now forms one united ſtate, and its colonies are not only a ready market for its manufactures, but alſo ſupply us abundantly with a great variety of commodities, which we formerly purchaſed from other nations, foreign commerce is now leſs neceſſary, and the moſt ſolid means of promoting our future aggrandizement, would be to give the greateſt encourage-

ment to population and induſtry. The two large and fruitful iſlands of Britain and Ireland could ſupport more than double the number of their preſent inhabitants; and beſides, Britons may now live in America adjoining to Britons, as ſecure from a foreign enemy as in an iſland, for an extent of upwards 2000 miles.

The apprehenſions of ſome, that if we ſuffer our colonies to ſpread over North America, they will ſoon ſhake off their dependance upon their mother country, ſeem weak and groundleſs. On the contrary, as the judicious author of *the intereſt of great Britain conſidered with regard to her colonies* obſerves, the wider we ſpread our colonies, on that continent, there is the leſs reaſon to fear their being diſunited from us. While they enjoy the ſame liberties and privileges as other Britons; we need not apprehend a univerſal confederacy, and it would not be the intereſt of any one colony to be diſunited from the Britiſh Empire, or of the others to ſuffer ſuch a diſmemberment. The different governments are mutual checks upon each other; if we ſhall therefore form two or three colonies on the Ohio and Miſſiſſippi, we thereby add ſo many new pledges for ſecuring the fidelity of the whole. That the immediate intereſt of any ſimple colony ſhould be ſubſervient to the intereſt of G. Britain, could afford no juſt cauſe of murmuring or diſcontent, as this would only be making the intereſt of a part give way to the intereſt of the whole; and in this iſland, we often find private perſons obliged to ſell part of their property to accommodate the public. The deſire of having a capital city among them, could hardly be a temptation to the coloniſts to revolt, for ſuppoſing this ſhould happen, one province could only be benefited by it, and the others, in-

ſtead of gaining an independancy, would become more dependant than they are at preſent. If we would wiſh the capital of the Britiſh dominions to be ſo ſituated, as beſt to promote the advantage of the whole Empire, it would be difficult, if not impoſſible, to find a ſpot more proper than that on which the city of London is built. As the intercourſe betwixt America and this iſland is open and uninterrupted, we ought to look upon our colonies there, merely as an extenſion of our inſular territory, rendering us ſtill *penitus toto diviſos orbe*; and, if they are conſidered in this view, they will appear as worthy of our attention as any affairs on the continent of Europe.

Of late, many people have begun to be alarmed at the greatneſs of the Ruſſian empire; but let us compare the extent, the populouſneſs, and power of this ſo much dreaded Empire, with the extent and ſtrength of the Britiſh empire. The territories belonging to Britain in Europe and America (if we include Canada, and all on the eaſt ſide of the Miſſiſſippi,) are near equal in extent to the territory belonging to Ruſſia, in Europe and Aſia, reckoning all ſouth from the 60 degree of latitude. As to the value of the northern deſarts of Siberia and Tartary, that is greatly overbalanced by our ſettlements in the Eaſt Indies, and on the coaſt of Africa. The Ruſſians, it is true, are ſuperior to us in numbers of people; but, if we confine ourſelves to the civilized inhabitants in each Empire (for little account is to be made of the barbarous Tartars ſubject to the one, or of the ſavages ſubject to the other) the ſuperiority will probably be but very inconſiderable. Or, if we rather reckon only the number of wealthy nobles, the ingenious and ſkillful artiſts, expert manufacturers, and induſtrious

labourers in each ſtate, the ſuperiority may juſtly be concluded to be on our ſide. The eaſineſs of communication contributes to the ſtrength of a kingdom, and it is evident, that the merchandiſe of the Ohio, could be tranſported to Britain, in a ſhorter time than the caravans are conducted from the eaſtern parts of the Ruſſian dominions to Peterſburgh. The numerous armies of the Ruſſians make their power appear formidable; but when we conſider that the revenues of that ſtate are not above a ſixth part of ours, and are not ſufficient to put thoſe armies in motion without foreign ſubſidies, their troops cannot be regarded as an actual force, but as an heavy burden upon themſelves, which greatly retards the improvement of their country and the civilizing of their people.

But were their armies to be even more numerous than they are, their ſtate could not juſtly be reckoned formidable, as their extenſive land frontier is liable to be invaded by the Chineſe, the Perſians, the Turks, the Poles, the Germans, and the Swedes, all of whom except the Chineſe are both powerful and warlike nations. Our frontiers, on the other hand, if we retain Canada and make the Miſſiſſippi the weſtern boundary of our empire, cannot be invaded by land, but by ſmall parties of American ſavages whoſe power can eaſily be controlled; and if an enemy ſhould threaten to invade our diſtant territories by ſea, our floating fortreſſes are always ready to carry ſuccours thither, and to retaliate the injuries of the invaders. While we therefore maintain our ſuperiority at ſea unrivalled, our territories in America need not be looked upon as diſjoined from Britain, and ſo long as they continue thus, we need not fear being over toped by the great Ruſſian empire, or by any other power in Europe.

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But as the American continent claimed by us, is inhabited not only by great numbers of civilized Europeans and their deſcendants, but alſo by multitudes of ſavages, if we would wiſh to ſee our power confirmed and peace ſolidly eſtabliſhed there, we ought to mak it our chief ſtudy to civilize the barbarous Indian tribes adjoining to our colonies. We have felt the pernicious effects of treating them with contemptuous pride and overbearing haughtineſs, and of ſuffering packmen to wander among them and to cheat them in their dealings. We have alſo ſeen in the example of Sir William Johnſon that they may be eaſily attached to us by acts of humanity, and by obſerving a moſt ſcrupulous ſincerity in our tranſactions with them. If they were all civilized and made obedient ſubjects they would be a conſiderable addition to our power; but tho' we ſhould not have the leaſt dealings with them, our colonies on that continent would ſtill be of the utmoſt importance to this nation. In all probability the Indians do not purchaſe Britiſh manufactures to the value of a pound a-piece annually, and is this trade of ſuch mighty conſequence, that we ſhould embroil ourſelves continually on that account, ſacrifice many ſuperior conſiderations to it, and have the ſword eternally drawn. While we ſuffer the worſt of our ſubjects to travel among them, and to cheat and deceive them, 'tis but natural to expect that they who look upon private revenge as a natural right, will deſpiſe the formalities of complaining, and do themſelves prompt juſtice upon the offenders. Some of our colonies, therefore, have prudently prohibited packmen from traveling among them, and have eſtabliſhed truck-houſes where the traffic is carried on under the direction of men of probity ſettled there as factors for

for the public. If all our colonies obſerved the ſame method, many occaſions of a rupture would thereby probably be cut off, and a mutual good underſtanding become more permanent.

It would alſo be no diſhonour to this nation, if we were earneſtly to apply ourſelves to familiarize them to our manner of life, and to inſtruct them in the Chriſtian religion, and if four or five years reſidence among them were to be made the road to ſolid preferment in the church, I doubt not but many miſſionaries would quickly offer themſelves. To attempt to influence the individuals among them to lay aſide their own manners and adopt ours, would probably be but an unſucceſsful labour, but if we could once perſuade the chiefs of their tribes, and their leading men to glory in imitating us, we might reaſonably expect that the faſhion would quickly ſpread among their followers; for *Regis ad exemplum totus componitur orbis.* Hiſtory furniſhes us with ſeveral inſtances of princes and princeſſes converted to Chriſtianity and introducing that religion among their heathen ſubjects. If two or three of the Indian chiefs were to be ſucceſſively reſident here, and allowed appointments like thoſe granted to the ambaſſadors from the Barbary ſtates; if they were taught that all of them being allies to the ſame great king, they ought not to war againſt each other; if they were perſuaded to build better houſes, and to have ſome coſtly furniture in them, their ſavage animoſity againſt us, and againſt each other would probably ceaſe, and they would begin to prefer ſettled habitations to a wandering life, which would be a conſiderable ſtep to their forſaking their barbarous cuſtoms, and embracing the manners of civilized nations.

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But it would be vain to expect a continuance of tranquillity in America, if Canada ſhould be reſtored to the French, or if they ſhould be ſuffered to enjoy the free navigation of the river Miſſiſſippi. By retaining Canada and totally excluding them from that part of North America, on this ſide the river Miſſiſſippi, we ſave ourſelves from the charge of defending a land frontier, and render the building of forts in the northern colonies unneceſſary. Thus the whole extent of country bounded on the Weſt by the Miſſiſſippi, and extending on the North to Hudſon's Bay, could be protected at a leſs charge than would be required to defend one half of it, if the other half were ceded to the French. By excluding the French we oblige the Indians to be more tractable and ſubmiſſive, for finding themſelves encircled every where with Britons ready and able to revenge any inſults from them, they would be under a neceſſity of continuing a friendly intercourſe, or at leaſt of abſtaining from violences. Our coloniſts would likewiſe be induced to ſpread themſelves diffuſively, when they found that they might make new ſettlements with ſecurity; and it is for the intereſt of Britain that they ſhould be widely ſcattered as planters, rather than be concentered as manufacturers in large towns.

Some who erroneouſly eſtimate the national advantages ariſing from our conqueſts, as the merchant computes the advantage ariſing from his traffic, namely by the ballance of money that they bring into us, affirm that Guadalupe is of more importance to the nation than Canada, and that if we are to reſtore one of them at the peace, it ought to be the latter, as all the commodities that can be imported from thence are not a third of the value of thoſe which Guadalupe can furniſh

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us with. But to thoſe who think peace, ſecurity, and ſuch an union of territory as doubles the ſtrength of the whole, to be the moſt conſiderable national advantages, Canada and its dependancies, will appear of more importance to us than the moſt wealthy of the French Weſt-India iſlands. England draws ten times as much money from Portugal as from Scotland, yet its union with the latter is of infinitely more importance to it than its connection with the former kingdom. The retaining of Canada, in all probability, will ſave this nation the expence of many millions, by cutting off any occaſion of a rupture in thoſe parts, and will ſoon double our ſtrength on the continent of America; but we can hardly reap any advantage from the poſſeſſion of Guadalupe that we could not acquire by cultivating the neutral iſlands in its neighbourhood.

But if we reflect on our ſucceſſes during this war, and on the diſtreſs of our enemy, it will, I think, be difficult to aſſign a reaſon why we ſhould be reduced to the alternative of either giving up Guadalupe or reſtoring Canada. If the French could find ſufficient reſources for ſupporting the expence of the war; if they were ſuperior on the ocean, had a moſt flouriſhing trade, and had conquered Jamaica and one or two of our northern colonies without having loſt any thing conſiderable themſelves, would they with ſuch a ſuperiority, think of the reſtitution of any of their conqueſts?

No doubt the conquerors, as well as the conquered, have need of peace; but it can hardly be made a queſtion which of them are under the moſt preſſing neceſſity to have tranquillity reſtored. The vanquiſhed muſt certainly feel the miſeries of the war in a much greater degree than the victors;

tors; it is more reaſonable therefore that they ſhould purchaſe a peace by relinquiſhing their claims to what they have not been able to defend, than that the victors ſhould condeſcend to buy an accommodation by reſtoring conqueſts, which they find themſelves fully able to maintain. If Guadalupe then ſhould be judged worth the keeping on the terms of the capitulation, we are entitled by our preſent ſuperiority to retain both it and Canada.

Tho' the French ſhould be allowed to ſettle on the Weſt of the Miſſiſſippi, it would not be proper to grant them the free navigation of that river with veſſels of any force. Conſidering their encroaching diſpoſition, 'tis probable they would make ſuch a conceſſion a handle for trading with the Indians on this ſide the river, and ſtirring them up to diſturb any new ſettlements we might form in thoſe parts, or on the banks of the Ohio. Were we on the other hand to keep two armed ſloops ſucceſſively ſtationed in thoſe rivers, ſuch a diſplay of our power would awe the Indians more, and be leſs expenſive to us than land forts. If the French were totally excluded, and the barbarity of the Indians was repreſſed, our preſent colonies would ſoon branch out into thoſe fertile countries, and would ſupply them with ſettlers without any further drain from the mother country.

But when the branches are becoming every day more large and numerous, there is a neceſſity that the trunk which ſuſtains them ſhould alſo be enlarged. Tho' the power of Britain be augmented by her colonies, yet her chief dependance for maintaining her preſent or future greatneſs muſt be upon her internal ſtrength, which ought to increaſe in proportion as her foreign ſettlements in-

creaſe, to ſerve as a juſt counterpoiſe to their influence. The expences of government are almoſt all raiſed upon the inhabitants of this iſland alone, and it is they chiefly who compoſe our armies and man our fleets. The true ſource for ſupplying all theſe will be found to be great numbers of people, and thoſe people employed in virtuous induſtry. Moſt of our writers on national affairs both antient and modern, ſeem to have almoſt wholly overlooked the great advantages of population and internal traffic, but have enlarged without ceaſing on the benefit of foreign trade; and the ſame partial and mercenary ſpirit ſeems in times paſt to have even infected our national councils. For one act in favour of agriculture we have twenty in favour of commerce, and almoſt every year there are propoſals canvaſſed for cultivating ſome new *branch* of foreign trade. But what gardener is ſo abſurd as to think of cultivating the *branches* of his trees? He applies his culture to the root, and in his management of the branches, only takes care that no branch ſhall be ſo luxuriant as to deprive the others of proper nouriſhment.

It was an obſervation, I think, of Sir William Petty, that if all the people of Scotland and Wales were tranſplanted into England, and thoſe countries were buried in the ſea, it would be greatly for the advantage of England. This ſentiment has been often repeated with applauſe, as a proof of ſhrewd diſcernment, tho' it is hardly poſſible to mention a more blind and partial deciſion. I will ſtate a caſe, which is not like his out of the courſe of nature, and which plain ſenſe might have dictated to many of our writers on trade, if they had not been ſo prejudiced as to refer almoſt all national advantages, not to the extenſion of territory and the peopling of that territory, but

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to the extenſion of commerce, and the wealth ariſing from it. Suppoſe the whole iſland of Britain, contained double the number of its preſent inhabitants, and the cultivation of its lands was alſo doubled, it could not be long before its foreign commerce would be greatly enlarged without one new act of parliament in its favour, and the ſtate would be twice as powerful as it now is, even tho' it were not ſo rich. Sir William Petty's falſe and narrow notion of eſtimating the power of a ſtate in proportion to its wealth, ſeems to have been adopted by moſt of our writers on commerce, and has long been a prevalent and undiſputed opinion; but the ſentiments of the great Lord Bacon were very different. *Illud magis tritum*, he ſays, *quam verum, quod nervi belli ſint pecuniæ.*

The wealth acquired by commerce is conſidered by writers on trade as the *ſummum bonum* of a ſtate, and that channel which brings in moſt money is by them judged moſt profitable, tho' it perhaps prevents us from purſuing another which would give employment to twice the number of people; but in their opinion, no matter how few people, provided the ballance of trade be large. If a perſon at home earns annually forty pounds, and ſpends forty pounds, the nation, they affirm, *is nothing the better for him*; but one perſon employed in commerce, will, from the ballance of the trade carried on by him, bring annually five pounds into the nation, conſequently it is the trader alone that advantages the ſtate. But let us ſuppoſe the perſon ſtaying at home, and ſpending all that he earns, to beget four children, he will in that view be as valuable a member of the commonwealth as the other, if he has no other merit to plead than that of adding five pounds yearly to

the national ſtock. Our Weſt India planters in in the valuation of their properties, rate the negro children at eight or ten pounds a head ; is it not then reaſonable that free born children in eſtimating the national ſtock ſhould be valued at twice as much as negroes, as the arts and trades followed by them are of more importance to a ſtate than the manual labour of ſlaves.

Suppoſe we ſhould double our commerce, without the acquiſition of new people (which might be done, if all who are idle in the nation were ſet to work, and new machines were invented for ſhortening labour) yet even on this ſuppoſition, the public revenue would thereby be but very little augmented. But were the number of ſubjects to be doubled, tho' our commerce were hardly of greater extent than at preſent, either the public revenue would be doubled, or the taxes would be lowered one half. It is allowed that there is not ſuch an abundance of money in France as in this iſland, and that the people here in general are much richer than the French. How comes it then that their revenue is ſo very conſiderable ? The anſwer is plain, namely, that they have more than twice the number of Subjects that we have to raiſe it upon. Eighteen millions of people paying ten ſhillings a head, will raiſe a greater revenue, than eight millions of people who are able to pay fifteen ſhillings each.

If there were double the preſent inhabitants in this iſland there would be double the number of houſes, and the value of land would alſo be doubled, conſequently the land-tax would amount to a ſum twice as large as at preſent. On the ſame ſuppoſition there would be double the quantity of beer and all other exciſeable commodities conſumed, which would alſo double the revenue in

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that branch. But beſides the increaſe of revenue, our commerce could not fail of being enlarged, which would augment the number of our ſailors and the ſtate would alſo be able to raiſe armies twice as numerous as the preſent, without diſtreſſing our manufactures. The power and greatneſs of the kingdom then depends much more upon numbers of people, if they are but ſo employed as to prevent the nation from loſing by its foreign traffic, than upon the ballance of trade however conſiderable it may be.

As numbers of people are of the greateſt importance to a ſtate, and it is generally acknowleged that there is a great deficiency of population in this iſland, ought not we to encourage foreign Proteſtants to ſettle among us, by freely granting them the privileges of native ſubjects by one general act of naturalization. Our wars are unavoidably becoming every day more and more expenſive; is it not then abſolutely neceſſary to think of reſources for enabling the nation to ſupport that expence in ſuch a manner as the individuals may not be burdened by it, either during a war itſelf, or for generations afterwards. And to any perſon who will but diveſt himſelf of the commonly received prejudices, the trueſt reſource for ſupplying the expences of the war, will appear to be great numbers of men, much rather than a large ballance of trade.

If means were purſued for augmenting the number of ſubjects, nothing could tend more to counterpoiſe the too great influence of the monied intereſt, as the properties of the landed gentlemen would increaſe in value in conſequence of the new occupiers of houſes and farms, and the revenues of the ſtate would alſo increaſe, which would render borrowing leſs neceſſary, and be a fund for

paying off the debts already contracted without any new tax. The riſing of rents, while money is every day ſinking in its value, is but a mere imaginary augmentation of an eſtate; but by increaſing the numbers of occupiers and conſumers, both land and money would riſe in value, and an eſtate might in that caſe be reckoned really improved.

Let us, as I before obſerved, conſider Britain as the center of a vaſt empire, and the trunk that ſuſtains many large and wide ſpreading branches, it will be evident that foreign commerce needs no longer be our principal concern; but that we ought to give our chief attention to the peopling of this fertile iſland to the remoteſt corners of it, that it may be able from itſelf to protect its diſtant ſettlements, afford them manufactures at an eaſy rate, and alſo ſupply them occaſionally with new ſettlers, as emigrations thither will now probably be more frequent than they have been for ſometime paſt. Great Britain could never ſo eaſily ſubſiſt without foreign commerce as at preſent, for the productions of all ſoils and all climates may now be found in Britiſh territories *.

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* If we regard the northern parts of America, we there find the productions of Ruſſia, Denmark, and Sweden. In our ſouthern colonies we raiſe the fruits of China, Perſia, and Arabia; and the products of Italy, Spain, France, and Turky, might eaſily be furniſhed to us from Penſilvania, Maryland, Virginia, Carolina, and Georgia. Our attention to cultivate the various products ſuited to the climate of our different colonies, will in all probability be the moſt effectual means of counteracting the commercial ſpirit that is now every day more and more prevailing in almoſt all the nations of Europe. The ſuperior advantages ariſing to Great Britain from the wide extent of her territories, have not eſcaped the obſervation of our neighbours, as appears from the following reflection of a judicious French writer. *Depuis que les intereſts*

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An extenſive ſtate, if it is at the ſame time very populous, could not fail of being rich and powerful, tho' the whole of its manufactures were conſumed within itſelf. The Chineſe have but very little foreign trade, yet their domeſtic and internal traffic maintains upwards of ninety millions of inhabitants. The foreign commerce of the Turks is but very inconſiderable; yet no body will deny but that they are a very formidable power. The Ruſſians, tho' their country is thinly peopled, and

de commerce, he ſays, *ont une influence ſi marquée ſur les principales operations politiques, l'agriculture eſt devenue plus lumineuſe, & plus floriſſante. Peut-etre arrivera-t-il que la balance du commerce des nations ſera uniquement celle du produit de leurs terres & de leurs coloniès. L'Angleterre qui a ſaiſi de bonne heure l'importance de cette objet a defriché ſes vaſtes deſerts dont le produit á augmenté conſiderablement les richeſſes de la nation* *. As many kinds of vines grow naturally in our colonies, it is ſurpriſing that we have ſo long neglected the attempting to ſupply ourſelves with wine from thence. This commodity could never interfere with the produce of the mother country, and if brought to perfection, as there is the greateſt reaſon to expect, conſidering the different climates of our colonies, would be a direct rivalſhip of one of the main branches of the commerce of the French, and hurt them more than the loſs of many battles. A modern French writer computes that by the ſale of their wines to foreigners they gain a million ſterling annually, which is more than our coloniſts gain by the ſale of their tobacco and rice together. The Virginia planters ought to be excited by their perſonal intereſt to attend to the cultivation of vines; for the demand for their ſtaple commodity may ſoon be leſſened, if the French ſucceed in their attempts to ſupply themſelves wholly with tobacco of the growth of the ſouthern provinces of France. Our coloniſts for theſe few years paſt have had the offer of a premium for cultivating vines from the laudable ſociety for the encouragement of arts, manufactures, and commerce; but when we conſider the greatneſs and importance of the object, it would ſeem to merit rather the conſideration of parliament than of a private ſociety.

* *Corps d'obſervations de la ſociete d'agriculture, de commerce, & des arts, etablie par les etats de Bretagne, annees* 1757, 1758.

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they are far from abounding in wealth, are nevertheleſs a potent nation, and capable of defending themſelves againſt any ſtate in Europe. If theſe nations who have an extenſive territory, are formidable without foreign commerce, ſo may Britain, if we maintain our ſuperiority at ſea, and turn our attention to the further peopling of this iſland and the territories belonging to it. Not that I would wiſh the leaſt decay in our foreign trade: on the contrary, the augmenting the number of people in this iſland, would not only increaſe the power, but would be the trueſt and eaſieſt way of enlarging our commerce. I only mean, that, conſidering the extent of the Britiſh dominions, both in Europe and America, it is a narrow view to regard this nation merely as a commercial ſtate, and the groſſeſt abſurdity, voluntarily to wiſh ourſelves in the ſame ſituation with the Dutch, as to extent of territory, for the ſake of having a large balance of wealth, flowing in to us from all our neighbours. The improving of our natural advantages, that is, the peopling our wide dominions but more particularly the iſland of Britain, with multitudes of induſtrious inhabitants, would render us both powerful and wealthy, without the ſupport of foreign trade, which ſeems every day becoming more and more precarious, from the ſucceſsful rivalſhip of many of our neighbouring ſtates.

The Dutch being confined to a very narrow and barren territory, had no other means of maintaining their independency and rendering themſelves powerful, than that of applying themſelves to foreign commerce, by which they have indeed acquired great wealth; but, nevertheleſs, as their territory is ſmall, they never can be a formidable ſtate; and it is evident, that they have been protected

tected hitherto, more by the alliances of their neighbours, than by their own ſtrength. The ſyſtem of another European State, namely Poland, is quite different from that of the Dutch. Among the Poles, who have very little foreign commerce, trade is in great diſrepute; but, as their nobles take delight in agriculture, and their country is fertile and extenſive, it affords ſubſiſtance to a great number of inhabitants, which renders them a powerful nation, though they do not abound in wealth.

If either of thoſe nations could unite to it the advantages of the other, it would doubtleſs be a moſt flouriſhing and formidable ſtate; but a union of ſuch different advantages is plainly impoſſible for the Dutch or Poles. Great Britain, however, having an extenſive territory, that will admit of being extremely populous, as it has on every ſide a free communication with the ſea, may eaſily unite the advantages peculiar to each of the above mentioned ſtates, and is therefore greatly deficient in her policy, while ſhe confines her attention ſolely to the advantages of commerce, and neglects thoſe ariſing from population, which is much more ſuited to the greatneſs of her empire. Beſides, population is ſo far from interrupting commerce, that it is the very baſis of it; and could we by the offer of naturalization, and by other encouragements, prevail with great numbers of induſtrious foreigners to ſettle among us, we need give ourſelves little concern about enlarging our foreign trade; for it would of itſelf force its way without public direction, if we only continue thoſe bounties that have been found ſo ſerviceable in foſtering infant manufactures.

We have in the courſe of this war, on a moderate computation, left 20,000, of our ſoldiers buried in Germany; and our loſs of men in our

other expeditions by ſea and land, in all probability, exceeds 60,000, in number. Should we not then wiſh to ſee their places ſupplied by others, who are deſirous of making this country their home, and would come to us in the vigour of their age, without having burdened the nation with the expences of their infancy. A foreign manufacturer who comes hither either alone, or with his wife and children, with a deſign of making this country his future abode, is, from that moment, no longer a foreigner, but a moſt uſeful recruit, enliſted in the nation's ſervice. The nation at preſent is evidently in great want of many ſuch recruits, and if we could by an act of naturalization, draw great numbers of induſtrious foreigners hither, nothing could contribute more to lighten the expences of government to the individuals, and conſequently to enable us to lower the prices of our manufactures, which is the trueſt means of extending our commerce. The landed Gentlemen particularly, would be doubly benefited by them; for they would not only occaſion a further improvement of land, and an increaſe of houſes, both which contribute to raiſe the rents of eſtates, but, by the ſhare they themſelves would bear in the public burdens, the amount of the taxes would be ſo increaſed, as to render a land tax, in time of peace, no longer neceſſary; and whither this is not an object worthy of the attention of the landed Gentlemen I leave them to conſider. There is no rank of men in the ſtate indeed, except the money brokers, who would not quickly feel the advantage of a conſiderable acquiſition of foreigners; but, to theſe laſt, an increaſe of inhabitants would be very diſagreeable, as the ſtate, by acquiring ſuch a natural ſupport, would be able gradually to clear off its incumbrances, which would put a ſtop to their uſurious traffic.

Penſilvania and our other northern colonies have felt no inconvenience from the many thouſand Germans that have ſettled there; but when we conſider the preſent advanced and proſperous ſtate of our American ſettlements, and the deficiency of a full population in this iſland, in proportion to the extent of our dominion, it would appear, that the nation would reap much more advantage from the ſettlement of great numbers of induſtrious foreigners in Britain, than if they ſhould tranſplant themſelves into any of our colonies in America.

Could not almoſt all our cities and towns eaſily admit of being twice as large as they are; and if they were ſo enlarged, would not the value of the lands round them be conſiderably increaſed, and would not the nation, in time of war, be able to exert itſelf with double vigour. Some indeed moſt abſurdly allege, that all trades and profeſſions are already overſtocked; and to ſuffer ſtrangers to flow in upon us, would be a means of doubling the number of our poor and conſequently increaſe the diſtreſſes of the nation. But this allegation, if it proved any thing, would prove too much; for, upon the ſame principle, we ought to prohibit all marriages for a certain number of years, to prevent for ſome time the birth of any more children, till thoſe who are already born ſhould in part be provided for. It would doubtleſs be thought abſurd to affirm, that the ſettling of 100 new ſmiths at Birmingham, or of 100 new weavers at Mancheſter, would increaſe the poor of thoſe towns, and it will appear equally abſurd, if we make the ſame ſuppoſition in regard to all the cities and towns in Great Britain.

That there are great numbers of idle perſons in this iſland is an undoubted truth; but this is ſo

far from being owing to an overabundance of people, that, on the contrary, it is chiefly occaſioned by a ſcarcity of inhabitants, and, if Great Britain contained double the number of people, there would be fewer idle perſons in it than at preſent, providing the laws relating to the poor were new modeled and juſtly regulated. Scotland and Ireland are thinly peopled in compariſon of England, yet the number of people wanting employment in thoſe countries is more conſiderable than in this part of the iſland; and many of their inhabitants, merely for want of work at home, come and ſeek employment in the populous cities of England. From this inſtance alone, not to produce others, it would appear, that there is the greateſt want of employment in thoſe countries that are moſt thinly inhabited, eſpecially when the cuſtom of forming new ſettlements has become obſolete, as in Scotland and Ireland, which is a great defect in their policy *. In a populous country, on the other hand, the reciprocal wants of the inhabitants create employment for all of them, and thoſe who follow the moſt inſignificant

* Many young and induſtrious manufacturers abſtain from marrying, or quit their native country for want of having an eaſy opportunity of ſettling in life, as the value of lands near inhabited places is very high, and the rents of houſes are a burden too heavy for them to bear. They might, however, at a very ſmall expence, be eaſed of both theſe inconveniences, if the parliaments of G. Britain and Ireland would, every three or four years, mark out ſpaces for new towns, at proper diſtances from any other habitations, and offer ſettlements in them *gratis*, to all manufacturers, who ſhould marry within that term and to none elſe. The value of even good land, in waſte places, is but a mere trifle; and to ſettle 1000 induſtrious families, in this manner, would not require ſuch a large ſum, as what is annually granted for endowing the foundling hoſpital, though, in all probability, it would be a means of raiſing a greater number of ſubjects to the ſtate, than that very coſtly poor houſe. A capital objection indeed may be made to this propoſal; it is not faſhionable.

profeſſions often procure a better livelihood than the poſſeſſors of hundreds of acres in a country that is but thinly inhabited.

Abſurd prejudices, when loudly trumpeted by a powerful faction, have often obſtructed national meaſures; but as our parties and prejudices have now moſt happily ceaſed, and our rulers, of late, have evidently purſued the welfare of the ſtate, with more diſcernment, and more enlarged views, than formerly, we may hope, that the only oppoſition, a general bill of naturalization would now meet with, would be from the clamours of a few intereſted tradeſmen, or thoſe of the ignorant mob. The outcry of the multitude, however, ought not to be regarded in matters that appear, with the evidence of mathematical demonſtrations, to perſons the leaſt acquainted with hiſtory and politics. Of the ſeveral millions of people in England, during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, but a very few perſons had prudence and foreſight enough, to commend the enterpriſes of Sir Walter Raleigh, and to foretel the benefit his diſcoveries would procure to the nation. He was openly reviled on the ſtage as a knave and villain, while the learned men abroad, as well as at home, were addreſſing their works to him, as to one of the moſt illuſtrious characters in Europe. He, however, notwithſtanding the clamours of the mob, purſued his noble and patriot deſigns with unabated ardour, being conſcious, that the cenſures of his envious cotemporaries would be repaid with the admiration of poſterity.

Edward III. not only granted a free naturalization to foreign manufacturers, but even ſupported them upon their arrival here by an allowance from the public treaſury, till ſuch time as they ſhould get employment; and like a great prince, he checked the turbulent ſpirit of ſome

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of the inhabitants of his chief cities, who, from narrow and ſelfiſh views, wanted to inſult and oppreſs the new comers. His ſteady perſeverance in purſuing the welfare of his dominions, though in direct oppoſition to the prejudices of the age in which he lived, was quickly attended with moſt beneficial conſequences. The foreign manufacturers having inſpired the other inhabitants with a ſpirit of induſtry, the national commerce was ſo greatly increaſed by their joint endeavours, that, notwithſtanding his expenſive wars, his ſubjects, at his death, abounded in wealth, though, before his reign, they were remarkable for their meanneſs and poverty.

To conclude, the ſettling of great numbers of induſtrious foreigners in this iſland, would ſo evidently promote the landed and commercial intereſt of the ſtate, that, as a farther inducement to tempt them hither, we ought, beſides the benefits of naturalization, to offer them, if they do not chuſe to ſettle in any town, the property of ſo much ground, as ſhould be requiſite for a ſmall houſe, in thoſe parts of the iſland that are not yet cultivated; and in imitation of Edward III. to diſperſe proclamations to this purpoſe all over Europe. In the reign of Queen Anne it was propoſed, to plant the Palatine refugees in the new foreſt in Hampſhire, which, before it was deſolated by William the conqueror, is ſaid to have contained thirty ſix pariſh churches; but a violent faction, who prided themſelves in oppoſing national meaſures, prevented that ſalutary ſcheme from taking effect. That fine ſpot, which has been unaccountably neglected, could contain many thouſand foreigners; and there are many other uncultivated parts of the iſland where great numbers of them might alſo, very conveniently, be ſettled.

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The nation is not only weakened for want of a due proportion of inhabitants; but is alſo greatly diſtreſſed by the ſloth and idleneſs that prevails among the poor, great numbers of whom are, in a manner, legally intitled to live without induſtry. One of the objections againſt a ſtanding army, in time of peace, is, the great expence to the nation of maintaining 16, or 20,000 idle men, who ought to ſupport themſelves by their own labour; yet we give no attention to the burden of another army, conſiſting of no leſs than 600,000 perſons; for ſuch the number of thoſe receiving alms was computed to be about 60 years ago, and it has rather encreaſed, than diminiſhed, ſince that time. Suppoſing one half of theſe were really invalids, or infirm, who were juſtly intitled to public charity, is it not, however, a diſgrace to our national policy to ſuffer the other half to prey upon the ſtate, when, by proper regulations, they might be made to contribute to the ſupport of it.

The act for maintenance of the poor is ſtiled, by an eminent writer, the true bane and deſtruction of all the Engliſh manufactures in general, as it apparently encourages ſloth and beggary. If that act, or any others relating to the poor, are found impolitic and burthenſome, ought we to ſcruple to make a thorough reform in them, or to new model them entirely * When we conſider what an additional ſpirit and vigour it would give to the ſtate,

* Tho' the miniſters of Queen Elizabeth were remarkable for their policy and prudence, yet they were far from being infallible; and the following obſervation of a judicious writer in the reign of Charles II. will ſhew that her parliaments did not always underſtand the true intereſt of the nation. "The "act of the 5. Eliz. 4" he ſays, "provides that no perſon "ſhall take an apprentice for woollen manufactures in any "town corporate, market town, or village, except ſuch ap- "prentice be his ſon, or elſe that the parents have the clear yearly

ſtate, were the labour of 2, or 300,000 of its people to be added to the national ſtock of induſtry, it muſt appear aſtoniſhing, that the means of effecting ſuch an important purpoſe have been deferred from year to year, even in profound peace, while affairs of very little conſequence have deeply intereſted our legiſlators. To countenance by law, the maintaining of the poor, I mean thoſe that are not infirm, any other way than by employing them, is certainly a moſt faulty eſtabliſhment, an eſtabliſhment which, if found among the Mohawks or Iroquois would be ridiculed by us, as contrary to common ſenſe, and mentioned as an inſtance of their barbariſm.

For many years paſt, the miſchiefs ariſing from the idleneſs of the poor, and the burden of maintaining them have often been complained of; but very few inſtances of any parliamentary attempts to redreſs thoſe grievances. Since the reign of Elizabeth indeed, till within theſe few years paſt, the weakneſs of ſome of our princes, the internal diſturbances in the kingdom, the foreign wars we were engaged in to check the ambition of

" yearly value of two pounds inheritance in towns corporate, " and three pounds in market towns and villages; whence it " follows that the corporations being poor, and ſcarce half " inhabited by not admitting others to ſupply their number " and defects, become daily more poor and leſs inhabited. " The children of poor people in villages being alſo denied " by the act of the 31. Eliz. 7. to erect cottages when they " become more than the tenements can receive or can be " employed in huſbandry, neceſſarily turn vagrant beg- " gars, ſtealers, canters, or at beſt, if they forſake not the " nation, do ſwell the ſuburbs of London already too big, " be hoſtlers, tapſters, drawers, and ſellers of ſtrong waters. " As the two acts of Eliz. abovementioned, have brought all " theſe miſchiefs upon town and country, ſo were they a " neceſſary preparative for the enacting that of the 43. of " Eliz. 2. for maintaining idle and lazy perſons in all the " pariſhes of England, which has produced ſo many and ſo " great inconveniencies." *Coke's England's Improvement.*

Lewis

Lewis XIV. and the factious conteſts, occaſioned by a corrupt adminiſtration, have ſucceſſively prevented our rulers from reforming many domeſtic abuſes, which could only be removed by a ſteady reſolution, and by calm and deliberate counſels. The happy tranquillity, however, which the nation, in all likelihood, will enjoy upon the concluſion of the preſent war, will afford leiſure to enquire into and correct many abuſes; and as the idleneſs of the poor, and the heavy burden of their maintenance, are among the chief public grievances, we may hope, that our legiſlators will at length apply themſelves with zeal and earneſtneſs, to eſtabliſh ſuch new regulations as may effectually remove thoſe evils.

One well digeſted law of two or three ſheets of paper would tend to clothe more naked, and feed more hungry, than all the pecuniary donations that are granted for charitable uſes in Great Britain annually. The new regulations therefore ought not to be the reſult of a few tranſient thoughts, haſtily compoſed from an imperfect view of the ſubject; but ought in every particular to be maturely weighed, that the future eſtabliſhments may be ſolidly founded on conſiſtent and comprehenſive principles; and there may be no occaſion for patching them afterwards by frequent alterations and amendments.

Several authors, particularly Davenant, Poſtlethwayt, and Fielding, have propoſed ſchemes for employing and maintaining the poor; and all of them have recommended work-houſes. If their writings were conſulted, or if a public reward was offered for the beſt plan for providing for the poor, the ſubject would probably be thoroughly canvaſſed, and ſuch information given, in all points relating to it, that it would be eaſy for the legiſlature to form a new and juſt ſyſtem of regulations.

Davenant adviſes to commit the management of the whole poor of the kingdom to a company or corpotion, the governors of which ſhould reſide in London, and have inferior officers in every pariſh. It was to private undertakers, he ſays, that we owe the order and method firſt introduced into the Poſt Office, Cuſtoms, and Exciſe. If theſe branches, therefore, which certainly are as intricate and as diffuſive as the direction of the poor could be, were never fully underſtood till they were farmed, we have the greateſt reaſon to expect, that by the management of a private company, the idle poor would ſoon be made uſeful members of the ſtate.

The overſeers of the poor, at preſent, ſeem induſtriouſly to diſcourage work-houſes, whether from ſome intereſted motive, or from a deſire to ſave themſelves the trouble of inſpecting them, I ſhall not determine; but when it has been propoſed to erect work-houſes for the poor, they have abſurdly pleaded, that it would be merely burdening their pariſhes with an additional expence. They allege, that thoſe who are kept at labour in work-houſes cannot earn by their induſtry ſo much as will pay for their maintenance; and likewiſe, that if they could, there is no vent for thoſe branches of manufacture, which they are capable of employing themſelves upon.

As to the firſt of theſe objections, though the poor could not by their labour earn their whole ſubſiſtence, yet thoſe who are not infirm might certainly earn a great part of it; and therefore ought not to be allowed to ſubſiſt idly, which is only an encouragement to them to indulge in vice and profligacy. But it may even be queſtioned, whether the poor, if kept at work, under proper regulations, might not maintain themſelves entirely by their own labour, as

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we have an inſtance of the ſurpriſing effects of application and induſtry in the city of Norwich, where, it is ſaid, that upwards of 5000 children, under ten years of age, gain a livelihood by their labour in ſome branches of manufacture.

The laſt objection, is abſolutely falſe, for, allowing that the poor, by proper regulations might be kept at work, it is impoſſible but the wants of ſociety, or the demands of foreign trade, muſt create a market for the fruits of their induſtry, however trifling they might be. Doubtleſs many trades and handicrafts require an apprenticeſhip of ſeveral years, before a perſon can be a proficient in them; but it is no leſs certain, that, in many kinds of employment, very little teaching is neceſſary, and that application, and a willing mind, would ſoon qualify the moſt inexpert for practiſing them. If we look over the liſt of goods imported and exported, we will find many hundred weight of twine, yarn, canvaſs, &c. weekly imported from Holland. Could not theſe articles, and many others of a like kind, be fabricated in our workhouſes? Who can anſwer, that they are not actually fabricated in the work-houſes in Holland, where 'tis well known the poor are kept conſtantly employed? If the poor of that country can be made uſeful to the ſtate, it is certainly a great abſurdity to pretend, that, in this kingdom, their labour could be of no benefit to the public.

According to the preſent regulations for providing for the poor, all pariſhes are put to a great expence be endeavouring each to throw the burden of itinerant beggars off themſelves. But if workhouſes were once eſtabliſhed throughout the kingdom, and all made ſubject to the ſame direction, there would no longer be any need of the law for paſſing of vagrants, which affords a pretence for raiſing large ſums upon the people;

for wherever a vagrant was found he might be made an uſeful ſubject by conducting him to the neareſt workhouſe; and if he wanted to go to his own pariſh, he might be tranſmitted without expence from workhouſe to workhouſe, and earn his ſubſiſtence in his way homewards. Of this we have an example in the practice of the journeymen in the hat manufactory, among whom it is a law that all new comers ſhall be immediately preſented with work. By the convenience of this law, ſeveral journeymen in that trade, have travelled thro' almoſt all the market towns in England, without having more than a day's wages in their pocket when they ſet out on their journey.

Were workhouſes univerſally eſtabliſhed, the induſtrious poor, many of whom are only employed occaſionally, might apply to be employed there at thoſe times when they want other buſineſs; and thoſe places might alſo ſerve for houſes of call, where farmers, manufacturers, brick-makers, &c. might have recourſe for ſupernumerary hands whenever they ſhould have occaſion for them. The general eſtabliſhment of workhouſes would alſo ſtrike a terror into thoſe troops of licentious vagabonds, who over-run the kingdom, and live in open contempt of both divine and human laws. Their inſolence is encouraged by the preſent neglect of the legiſlature; but if they found that it was impracticable for them any longer to indulge their idle life, they would probably not be ſo daring, and their numbers would ſoon decreaſe. Almoſt all thoſe vagabonds ought to be looked upon as felons, for they daily ſteal more by canting words than what others are tranſported for, and if they cannot be induced by any motives, to apply themſelves to work here, it were indeed better for the nation that they were really tranſported and ſent as ſlaves

to our Weſt India colonies. Many of the beggars who infeſt the ſtreets of this metropolis, finding no reſtraint laid upon them, impudently breed up their little children in the ſame infamous profeſſion; and the young vagabonds who ought to be taken and ſent to houſes of correction and inſtruction, are imprudently encouraged and commended forſooth, for their inſinuating addreſs, which is an inducement to them to preſervere in their idle callings, without ever thinking of induſtry. While thoſe beggars are left to the cognizance of conſtables, little reformation can be expected; but if workhouſes were eſtabliſhed, and a porter, chairman, or any other perſon was to be entitled to a reward of two ſhillings for bringing one of them to thoſe houſes, the ſtreets in all probability would ſoon be cleared of them, and many who now ſpend their time idly with an averſion to induſtry, would apply themſelves to work at home, to avoid being forced to labour in public workhouſes. Their children ought likewiſe to be taken from them; for it could not be looked upon as any juſt hardſhip to deprive them of the precious liberty of a gipſey and vagabond; and thoſe who ſhould undertake to inſtruct and educate them ſhould be intitled to their work for a term of years twice or thrice as long as the uſual time of apprenticeſhip.

The employment of the poor, the puniſhment of felons, and the naturalization of foreigners have been the ſubject of parliamentary deliberation within theſe few years paſt: but the war intervening called off the attention of the legiſlature for ſome time to more preſſing objects. Upon the return of peace, however, we have the greateſt reaſon to hope, that the conſideration of theſe and many other eſſential points, relating to the domeſtic government of the kingdom will be again

reſumed, particularly the means for leſſening the national debts and incumbrances, which point will be far from being the moſt difficult to be accompliſhed, if purſued with ſteadineſs and reſolution. The throne is at preſent poſſeſſed by a virtuous and active prince, we have a parliament choſen without the intervention of miniſterial influence, and the people ſeem to expreſs a deſire of ſeeing the flagrant abuſes that have ſo long prevailed in many branches of public adminiſtration at length reformed; could we then wiſh for a more favourable opportunity of deſtroying the ſyſtem of corruption, which has gradually brought the nation to the very brink of a precipice. The venal tribe who have long countenanced a proſtitution of principle, becauſe it beſt promoted their mercenary and ſelfiſh views, may indeed attempt to fruſtrate the endeavours of an upright king, and honeſt and independant parliament; but it is to be hoped that their ſophiſms will no longer be able to blind the nation, and that the clamours raiſed by them will only redound to their own confuſion. The preſent happy union of integrity and authority gives us the faireſt proſpect of ſoon ſeeing thoſe political grievances, which have been the conſequence of a long period of corruption, removed, and an end put to the rule and direction of Jews, jobbers, and contractors, who for many years paſt have preyed with the utmoſt rapacity upon the diſtreſſes of the public. If the patriot deſigns of the ſovereign, and the zeal of an independant parliament are ſeconded by the endeavours of honeſt men, the nation will eaſily emerge from its preſent difficulties, its power and influence will increaſe, the ſciences and arts will flouriſh, and the reign of George III. be the moſt glorious period of the Britiſh hiſtory.

FINIS.